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Tax, Command... or Nudge?: Evaluating the New
Regulation

Brian Galle*
This Article comparesfor the first time the relative economic efficiency of
"nudges" and other forms of behaviorally inspired regulation against more
common policy alternatives, such as taxes, subsidies, or traditional quantity
regulation. Environmental economists and some legal commentators have
dismissed nudge-type interventions out of handfor their failure to match the
revenues and informationalbenefits taxes can provide. Similarly, writers in the
law and economics tradition argue that fines are generally superior to
nonpecuniarypunishments.
Drawing on prior work in the choice-of-instruments literature, and
contrary to this popular wisdom, I show that nudges may out-perform fines,
other Pigouvian taxes, or subsidies in some contexts. These same arguments
may also imply the superiority of some traditional "command and control"
regulations over their tax or subsidy alternatives. I then apply these lessons to
a set of contemporary policy controversies, such as New York City's cap on
beverage portion sizes, climate change, retirement savings, and charitable
contributions.
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Introduction
It wasn't anyone's first choice. Diabetes, hypertension, and heart
attacks were all on the rise in New York, and with them the City's costs of
care.' The mayor's office explored a "sin tax" on soda and fatty foods, but
food and beverage industry lobbyists went to Albany and blocked the tax in
the state legislature.2 So the City leaders searched for other ways to
confront its citizens with the true costs of unhealthy lifestyles. They came
up with the cap: No covered establishment could sell sugary beverages over
16 ounces in volume.3 New York would become the City of Refills.
Critics were legion. Some complained that the city was setting up a
"nanny state" to protect New Yorkers from themselves.4 Others, perhaps
1. Diabetes Among New York City Adults, NYC VITAL SIGNS (N.Y.C. Dep't of Health &
Mental Hygiene), Nov. 2009, at I, 3; Notice of Public Hearing, Opportunity to Comment on the
Proposed Amendment of Article 81 (Food Preparation and Food Establishments) of the New York
City Health Code, found in Title 24 of the Rules of the City of New York (June 5, 2012),
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/notice/2012/amend-food-establishments
.pdf.
2. Michael M. Grynbaum, New York Plans to Ban Sale of Big Sizes of Sugary Drinks, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 30, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/3 l/nyregion/bloomberg-plans-a-ban-onlarge-sugared-drinks.html?pagewanted=all.
3. Id.
4. Nick Gillespie, 3 Cheersfor Coercive Paternalism-Or,Why Rich, Elected Officials Really
Are Better than You, REASON (Mar. 25, 2013, 10:41 AM), http://reason.com/blog/2013/03/25/3cheers-for-coercive-paternalism-or-why; Katrina Trinko, Soda Ban? What About Personal
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unaware of the legal maneuverings that preceded the cap, argued something
of the opposite: if the City wanted to make beverages scarcer, it should
have just imposed a tax.5 Yet others doubted the cap would have any effect
at all. 6 Despite the many skeptics, and as of this writing a set-back in the
New York courts, the idea has proven popular in other municipalities,
several of which are reportedly studying versions of their own.7
The beverage cap arrives after a decade of debate over "nudges" and
other forms of behaviorally informed regulation. As Richard Thaler and
Cass Sunstein, Ian Ayres, and others have ably summarized, evidence
shows us that innocuous little speed bumps, like the nuisance of getting
back up to fetch another cup of cola, or of filling out a form to start saving
for retirement, can have surprising impact on individual behavior.8 Choice
architecture, the timing and context in which options are presented,
matters. 9 That ice-cold Coke is a lot more tempting when we can see it
fizzing sweetly beneath our thirsty lips than when it's stowed around the
corner.10 Time will tell, but there are now many good reasons to think the
cap will work better than some have predicted.

Choice?, USA TODAY (Mar. 10, 2013, 5:40 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/
03/1 0/soda-ban-what-about-personal-choice-column/1977091/.
5. Sarah Kliff, Why Ban Soda When You Can Tax It?, WONKBLOG, WASH. POST (June 1,
2012, 1:16 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/why-ban-soda-when-youcan-tax-it/2012/06/01/gJQAT27E7U blog.html; Nathan Sadeghi-Nejad, NYC's Soda Ban Is a
Good Idea, But a Tax Would Be Better, FORBES, Sept. 13, 2012; Matthew Yglesias, A Soda Tax
Would Be Smart, Banning Big Cups Is Dumb, SLATE (June 1, 2012, 10:49 AM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2012/06/01/a-soda-tax-would-be smartbanningbigcu
psis Idumb.html; see also Robert H. Lustig et al., The Toxic Truth About Sugar, 482 NATURE 27,
28 (2012) (describing taxes as "the most.., effective" policy for curbing excess sugar
consumption).
6. Jacob Sullum, The Benefit of Bloomberg's Big Beverage Ban, REASON (June 20, 2012),
reason.com/archives/2012/06/20/the-benefit-of-bloombergs-big-beverage-b.
7. Brock Parker, Cambridge Mayor Proposes Limits on Soda Sizes: Idea Surprises City
Council, BOSTON GLOBE, June 19, 2012, http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2012/06/18/
cambridge-consider-limiting-soda-sizes/j9PEQXqVRkbPWJBXALVYDP/discuss.html;
Mark
Segraves, Some on D.C. Council Favor Restricting Sugary Drinks, WTOP (Oct. 23, 2012, 7:22
AM), http://www.wtop.com/41/3088930/DC-Council-considers-restricting-sugary-drinks.
In
addition, many jurisdictions have already imposed some kind of tax on unhealthy food or drink.
Alberto Alemanno & Ignacio Carreflo, Fat Taxes in the EU Between Fiscal Austerity and the
Fight Against Obesity, 2011 EUR. J. RISK REG. 571, 571-72; Michael F. Jacobson & Kelly D.
Brownell, Small Taxes on Soft Drinks and Snack Foods to Promote Health, 90 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 854, 855 tbl.1 (2000).
8. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STIcKS 3-44 (2010); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 74-102
(rev. ed. 2009).
9. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 83-102.
10. For overviews of the evidence that portion sizes affect consumption, see BRIAN
WANSINK, MINDLESS EATING 17-19, 47-52 (2006), and Pierre Chandon, How Package Design
and Packaged-BasedMarketing Claims Lead to Overeating, 35 APPLIED ECON. PERSPECTIVES &
POL'Y 7, 13-18 (2013).
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Many other policy designers have taken those lessons to heart. Both
the United States and the United Kingdom have recently launched
government offices to expand the use of behaviorally informed regulation."
Efforts are already under way to cue families about their energy usage, to
display healthy cafeteria foods in ways that are more appealing to kids, to
make organ donations psychologically easier, and to make abortions more
"informed" but emotionally more difficult. 12 Some noted economists have3
hinted recently at replacing the entire $125 billion in U.S. tax incentives'
for retirement savings with a system in which individuals will have to opt
out of saving rather than the most common current default, which is to opt
in. 14 Proposals to rely on nudges now span the globe and virtually every
regulatory domain.' 5
Despite the rapid policy evolution of nudges, debate over whether they
should be used is less developed. 16 To be sure, there has been much debate
over whether nudges escape the standard "paternalism" critique of
government regulation. Proponents argue that nudges represent "libertarian
paternalism" or are otherwise not coercive in the sense of traditional
government regulation: People always retain the freedom to defy the
government's preferences, and in many cases the costs of defiance are quite
small.' 7 Yet these arguments seem not to have assuaged the many antipaternalism complaints about the nudge framework.18

11. RHYS JONES ET AL., CHANGING BEHAVIOURS: ON THE RISE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
STATE xii (2013); Cheryl K. Chumley, White House Pressesfor Team of 'Nudge' Experts to Sway
American Behavior, WASH. TIMES, July 30, 2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/
jul/30/white-house-presses-team-nudge-experts-sway-americ/.
12. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 1-2, 177-84, 231-39; Hunt Allcott et al.,
Energy Policy with Externalities and Internalities 33-34 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 17977, 2012), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/wl7977; A Nudge on a
Hot Button Issue, NUDGE (May 1, 2008), http://nudges.org/a-nudge-on-a-hot-button-issueabortion/.
13. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
14. Raj Chetty et al., Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowdout in Retirement Savings
Accounts: Evidence from Denmark, Q.J. ECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 43), available at
http://www.rajchetty.com/index.php/papers-and-data/papers-and-data-listed-chronologically.
15. JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at vii-xii; see also On Amir & Orly Lobel, Liberalism and
Lifestyle: Informing Regulatory Governance with BehaviouralResearch, 2012 EUR. J. RISK REG.
17, 17-18.
16. See Pierre Schlag, Nudge, Choice Architecture, and Libertarian Paternalism,108 MICH.
L. REv. 913, 919 (2010) (offering this critique of the nudge framework).
17. Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: BehavioralEconomics and the Case
for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1211, 1212 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein &
Richard H. Thaler, LibertarianPaternalismis Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. Cm. L. REV. 1159, 116062 (2003) [hereinafter Sunstein & Thaler, LibertarianPaternalism].
18. See Claire A. Hill, Anti-Anti-Anti-Paternalism, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 444, 445-48
(2007); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Casefor Paternalism,97 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1165, 1219-25 (2003); Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem
of New Paternalism, 2009 BYU L. REV. 905, 909; Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg,
Behavioral Law & Economics: Its Origins,FatalFlaws, andImplicationsfor Liberty, 106 Nw. U.
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These debates are unlikely to end soon. Libertarians reject the claim
that nudges do not reduce human freedom.' 9 Nor do they see nudges as
distinctive on that front: as the Harvard economist Ed Glaeser argues, taxes
too permit individuals to defy the government at a price that sometimes is
modest.20 A soda tax can readily be avoided by skipping the sipping, and
abstinence is easy for those without a sweet tooth.
Nudge proponents have for some reason left aside another strong
potential argument. Even if nudges and their ilk are no less coercive than
other forms of regulation, might they be preferable because they are
economically more efficient? 2 1 If so, in what settings? Assuming policy
makers can choose freely among both new and old regulatory instruments,
what factors should they consider in deciding which to use?
This Article takes up these questions. I argue that nudges and other
novel regulatory instruments can be evaluated using tools that are mostly
already familiar in the economics of regulation. For example, at least since
Gary Becker's seminal 1968 article, punishment theorists have argued over
whether fines are a better enforcement tool than prison, with "shaming" and
other collateral sanctions more recently joining the mix. 22 Environmental
economists similarly debate the regulatory choice between taxes and other
regulatory options, such as "command and control" regulation.23
Commentators overwhelmingly prefer taxes and other "price
instruments" to regulation, and this would seem to be bad news for nudge
defenders.24 Both taxes and regulation distort private behavior. Taxes also
bring in revenues, though, which can be used to improve the lives of those

L. REv. 1033, 1067-79 (2012); M. Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge, or Notice? 10-13 (Univ. of Wash.,
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2013-04, 2013), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=2217013.
19. Cf On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict,Nudge: How BehavioralEconomics Informs
Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 2098, 2120-22 (2008) (suggesting that nudges are not value
neutral); Gregory Mitchell, Review Essay, LibertarianPaternalismis an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L.
REv. 1245, 1260-61 (2005) (arguing that libertarians would not be persuaded by Sunstein and
Thaler's welfarist claims).
20. See Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalismand Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 133, 135 (2006)
(comparing a nudge to a psychic tax).
21. See Chetty et al., supra note 14 (noting that normative comparison of defaults and price
instruments would be "a natural next step" for the literature).
22. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
196-99 (1968); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of
Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECONOMICS 403, 407-08, 409 & n. 10 (A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell eds., 2007); Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming Whi(e-Collar Criminals:A
Proposalfor Reform of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 366-68 (1999);
Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L. & ECON. 519, 520
(1996).
23. Gloria E. Helfand et al., The Theory of Pollution Policy, in HANDBOOK OF
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 249, 251, 287 (Karl-G~ran Maler & Jeffrey R. Vincent eds., 2003);
Ian W.H. Parry & Wallace E. Oates, Policy Analysis in the Presence of Distorting Taxes, 19 J.
POL'Y ANALYsIs & MGMT. 603, 608-10 (2000).
24. For elaboration of the points in this paragraph, see infra subparts If(A) and 11(B).
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who are inconvenienced by the regulatory policy. Glaeser claims that this
same factor makes taxes more economically efficient than nudges. 25
Moreover, commentators argue that prices can reveal private information
that other unpriced regulation-such as, perhaps, New York's beverage
26
limits--cannot.

As I will attempt to show, these claims about the superiority of taxes
and tax-like instruments rest on overly simplifying assumptions, neglect
possible innovations in governance structures, and do not apply fully for
some nudges.
For example, I argue that the supposedly unique
informational benefits of price instruments can be captured through smallscale experiments, and this information used to run a larger regulatory
scheme. I also argue that the revenue benefits of price instruments are
considerably smaller than commentators assume in many settings; among
other reasons, I show that nudges may have lesser negative impact on labor
supply than their tax-like alternatives.
Further, by their nature prices usually require us to transfer resources
from one party to another. Prior authors, including this one, have debated
government's choice between two kinds of prices.27 On the one hand are
sticks, which can include taxes and other kinds of subjective changes for the
worse. 28 On the other are carrots, which can include subsidies, or perhaps
just relief from a currently expected cost. Although these instruments
usually have very similar marginal effects, they also can differ importantly
from one another in their impact on actors' preferences, in their incentives
for future behavior, in their distributive consequences, and in their politics.
Choosing between the two often requires balancing between these
considerations.
Nudges and other transferless regulation, I'll argue, represent a hybrid
or middle ground between sticks and carrots, and thus offer yet a third set of
possible trade-offs.2 9 For example, it is true that the beverage cap brings in
no revenue for New York. But at the same time, it may also have better
distributive consequences than a soda tax and avoid unwanted effects on

25. Glaeser, supra note 20, at 150.
26. See infra subpart 1(A).
27. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit De Geest, Carrots,Sticks, and the MultiplicationEffect,
26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 365, 365-66 (2009); Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics
and Politics in the Choice of Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REv. 797, 813-40 (2012); Jonathan
Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE
L.J. 677, 755-60 (1999).
28. For discussion of the points in this paragraph, see infra subpart 1(C).
29. I don't mean to suggest that the three are mutually exclusive.
See Michael P.
Vandenbergh et al., Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95 MINN. L. REV. 715, 719 (2011)
(proposing "[plairing price-[based]... approaches with behavioral approaches").
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preferences and incentives.3 ° Whether the cap is an attractive policy
depends on the weights attached to these alternative consequences.
Similarly, as I show through additional examples, many other nudges
can be compared directly to tort liability, taxes, or subsidies. Nudges might
represent an important way forward for preventing climate change, where
politics has stymied the best choices but the remaining traditional
alternatives are mostly subsidies with crippling side-effects. At the same
time, nudge enthusiasts may want to do some additional calculations before
rushing to scrap the U.S. retirement-incentive system, as some noted
authors have recently proposed.3'
Part I of the Article sketches some background for readers new to these
concepts. Part II lays the groundwork for later analysis by refining existing
tools for comparing policy instruments. Part III employs my framework to
compare nudges and other novel regulation to traditional alternatives.
Part III also argues that the prevailing view of the superiority of corrective
taxation over regulation may fail to consider some important factors.
Part IV then applies these general principles to a series of (hopefully)
illuminating examples, including soda and climate change as well as
retirement savings, charity, and others.
I.

Regulating Externalities: An Introduction
Modern economic theories of government regulation begin with the
33
32
premise that markets sometimes fail. Externalities are a classic example.
An externality, simply put, is a harm (negative externality) or benefit
(positive externality)
that affects someone other than the actor making an
34
economic decision.

30. Prior legal analyses of "sin taxes" have tended to emphasize instead philosophical
questions about the government's role in regulation, Gary Lucas, Jr., Saving Smokers from
Themselves: The PaternalisticUse of Cigarette Taxes, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 693, 698-742 (2012),
or questioned whether government should share in the profits from bad deeds, Andrew J. Haile,
Sin Taxes: When the State Becomes the Sinner, 82 TEMP. L. REv. 1041, 1053-63 (2009). The
substantial literature on the regulation of obesity does already raise some questions about the best
methods for regulating but has not yet attempted to compare nudges to more traditional
alternatives. See E. Katherine Battle & Kelly D. Brownell, Confronting a Rising Tide of Eating
Disordersand Obesity: Treatment vs. Prevention and Policy, 21 ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 755, 762
(1996); Tom Marshall, Exploring a Fiscal Food Policy: The Case of Diet and Ischaemic Heart
Disease, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 301, 301 (2000); Katherine Pratt, A Constructive Critique of Public
Health Arguments for Antiobesity Soda Taxes and Food Taxes, 87 TIJL. L. REV. 73, 114-39
(2012); Jeff Strnad, Conceptualizing the "Fat Tax": The Role of Food Taxes in Developed
Economies, 78 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1221, 1294-1322 (2005); Stephen D. Sugarman & Nirit
Sandman, Fighting Childhood Obesity Through Performance-Based Regulation of the Food
Industry, 56 DUKE L.J. 1403, 1429-90 (2007).
31. Chetty et al., supra note 14.
32. JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (3d ed. 2011).
33. Id. at 123.
34. Id. at 124-28.
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In general, the goal of regulation is neither to eliminate negative nor to
produce boundless quantities of positive externalities but rather to achieve
what might be called the optimal level of externality. 35 Eliminating even
the worst pollutants is costly. 36 Should government bankrupt coal
producers, or is there a way to balance clean air against the costs of
achieving it? On the positive externality side, everyone might agree that
charity is beneficial. But should government spend millions to clothe or
educate one more child?
Economists typically answer these kind of balancing questions using
marginal analysis. 37 Under this approach, the policy maker asks herself,
"on the margin-that is, for the very next unit of good or bad producedwhat is the harm or benefit of that one unit for everyone in society?" We
might therefore call this the "marginal social damage," (MSD) in the case
of a negative externality and "marginal social benefit" (MSB) for a positive
one. She then compares this harm or benefit against the marginal costs to
the producer. If the producer's private marginal cost is greater than the
marginal social damage, it doesn't pay, on net, to prevent the damage:
counting the producer's losses, society would lose by forcing the producer
to avoid the externality.3t
To see this graphically, consider Figure 1.

35. Id. at 139; Helfand et al., supra note 23, at 253.
36. GRUBER, supra note 32, at 122-23.
37. Id. at 124.
38. Note, importantly, that for simplicity we are assuming here that we should count the costs
and benefits for the producer and everyone else equally. That's a controversial proposition, but
I'll leave it aside here for ease of exposition.
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Figure 1: Optimal Externality Production

Cost

Producer's
Marginal Costs

A

Social Marginal
Damage / Benefit

More Charity
More Pollution

Quantity
In Figure 1, the upward-sloping line represents the marginal cost curve
for the externality producer: as we trace the line rightwards, each additional
unit of pollution reduction (say, one ton less of carbon) or charitable output
(say, another bed in a homeless shelter) is costlier to achieve. 39 The
downward-sloping line is the marginal social benefit curve: each unit is
slightly less beneficial than the last. 40 At point A, the two lines intersect.
This is the optimal point. 41 Anywhere to the right of A, the costs of charity
or pollution reduction outweigh the benefits. To the left, we've left costeffective improvements on the table.
We could imagine a few ways of achieving production at this level A.
If government knew the shapes of the two curves, it could calculate the

39. This reflects the likelihood that firms will undertake the cheapest efforts first and then
have to work harder and harder to achieve further milestones. For instance, at some point, adding
more beds means building a new building.
40. Again, diminishing marginal utility is a standard assumption here. We probably house the
neediest persons first, and at some point we're offering shelter space to Bill Gates.
41. I'm simplifying here for the sake of exposition. A more rigorous approach to setting the
optimal quantity would also account for other factors that might affect the efficiency of the
regulation. For example, if the regulation imposes costs, and the expectation of those costs
changes behaviors other than the production of the externality-for example, distorts consumer
choices among products-the ideal regulation might balance disruption of these expectations
against pollution control. See Helmuth Cremer et al., Externalities and Optimal Taxation, 70 J.
PuB. ECON. 343, 346 (1998).
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quantity of output at A and simply mandate that producers achieve it, with

jail for those who refuse.
Another approach is to set a price for producers.

In the case of

pollution, government could impose a fee or tax on each unit of carbon in

an amount equal to the producer's marginal cost at point A; this price is
labeled tau in Figure 1. For producers whose costs of eliminating the next

unit of carbon are below tau, they will eliminate it, saving themselves tau
minus their cost. For producers whose costs are above tau, they will simply
emit the carbon and pay the tax. Thus, just as with the mandate, rational
producers should produce exactly the amount of carbon at point A. Or,
similarly, government could pay producers to eliminate carbon or produce
charity. Once more, if the government offers a price tau, only producers
who can fill a shelter bed for less than tau will take the offer.

Economists often call the first of these approaches "quantity
regulation ' and the second two "price instruments. '' 3 Lawyers may be
more familiar with the similar divide between what Calabresi and Melamed

termed "property rules" and "liability rules. ''44
Most commentators strongly favor price instruments over quantity
regulation, except in settings where special administrative considerations
make prices impractical. 45 As Kaplow and Shavell show, prices can be
used to duplicate most of the features of mandates. 46 Prices provide vital

information to the government that regulation supposedly does not, as we'll
see in more detail shortly.4 7 Further, prices are said to provide for revenues
48

that the government can use for other projects, while regulations do not.
Glaeser's critique of nudges and similarly novel behavioral forms of
regulation is typical in this regard.

Glaeser argues that both taxes and

nudges create economic distortions, but only taxes bring in money to help

42. GRUBER, supra note 32, at 140.
43. THOMAS STERNER, POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 148, 214-15 (2003).
44. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972); see also Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109
HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1996).
45. GRUBER, supra note 32, at 140; Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental
Economics: A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 675, 686 (1992); Don Fullerton et al.,
Environmental Taxes, in DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN: THE MIRRLEES REVIEW 423, 429 (James
Mirrlees et al. eds., 2010); Cameron Hepburn, Regulation by Prices, Quantities, or Both: A
Review ofInstrument Choice, 22 OxFORD REV. ECON. POL'y 226, 228-29 (2006). As an example
of a special consideration, price instruments may be riskier than quantity regulation when the
marginal social damage curve is steep but its exact shape is uncertain, GRUBER, supra note 32, at
143-46, and the policy maker cannot sharply vary the tax rate to account for this risk.
46. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity
Regulation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 7-10 (2002).
47. Id. at 4.
48. E.g., Helfand et al., supra note 23.
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offset those losses.49 Perhaps graphic images of the harms of cigarette
smoking printed on the sides of packs would be repulsive enough that the
smokeis switch to cigarillos or pipe tobacco, which are nearly as harmful
but which they enjoy less. Or perhaps some smokers cannot quit, but also
suffer added pain as a result of the imagery. 50 Further, unlike a cigarette
tax, the graphic images don't bring in any revenues that could be used to
improve the lives of smokers or anybody else. To take another example,
workers who are defaulted into a savings program, who are unwilling to pay
the costs of the opt-out mechanism, and who genuinely would prefer not to
save are worse off than in the absence of the nudge. 51 A number of other
economists have recently made a similar point about the preferability of a
carbon tax over other regulatory alternatives: regulations change
consumption patterns, creating deadweight loss, but bring in no offsetting
dollars.52
Glaeser's point echoes a much older debate over the most efficient
form of punishment for crimes. Becker, and later Polinsky and Shavell,
53
have argued that in many situations fines are superior to imprisonment.
Both reduce the utility of the offender. The fines, though, can be used to
transfer 54that loss to someone else, resulting in greater overall social
welfare.
Over the remainder of the Article I want to first flesh out, and then
question, many of these well-established assumptions about the superiority
of prices to other regulatory alternatives. As we'll see, some long-standing
claims may not hold up to close scrutiny, especially once we factor in some
of the unique aspects of the newest regulatory alternatives.

49. Glaeser, supra note 20, at 135, 150; see also Lucas, supra note 30, at 726-30 (observing
that optimal cigarette tax rates differ from person to person because of heterogenity among
smokers); Mitchell, supra note 19, at 1268, 1274 (explaining that the cost of increasing benefits to
irrational persons will often be borne by rational ones); Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 18, at 96061 (discussing problems of over- and under-inclusion that arise under one-size-fits-all tax models).
50. Andrew Caplin, Fear as a Policy Instrument, in TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL

PERSPECTIVES

ON

INTERTEMPORAL

CHOICE

441,

442,

452

(George

Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003); see Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, 99 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1415
(2011) (making this point about imperfectly targeted nudges generally).
51. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism,73
U. CHI. L. REV. 207, 224-25 (2006); cf Schlag, supra note 16, at 917 (noting that nudges may
have more dramatic effects on behaviors than command-and-control regulation).
52. Helfand et al., supra note 23, at 287; Ian W.H. Parry et al., When Can Carbon Abatement
Policies Increase Welfare? The Fundamental Role of Distorted Factor Markets, 37 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 52, 52 (1999); see also Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of
Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2091 (2012). However, Ayres also notes the potential
targeting advantages of using what he calls "sticky defaults." Ayres, supra, at 2091-92.
53. Becker, supra note 22, at 193-99; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 22, at 407-20.
54. Becker, supra note 22, at 180; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 22, at 408. Becker credits
an early version of this point to Bentham. Becker, supra note 22, at 193 n.40.
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II.

Policy Instruments in Three (or More) Dimensions
In order to assess the new evolving set of policy tools, it may be useful
to situate them in the context of more familiar mechanisms. The new tools,
I'll argue, share many features in common with those we already know. To
see those features and how they interact, in this Part I'll attempt to break
down the potential policy toolkit into its component parts. Since each part
has distinctive features-adds to the treasury or draws from it, redistributes
funds or doesn't, and so on-when we rebuild our tools from their
components we'll be better able to see the consequences of the tool we
choose. Other authors have made some of these distinctions before, so not
all the components will be wholly new. But the overall picture, and its
lessons, are novel.
A.

Price vs. Quantity and Refinements
As we just saw, the distinction between price instruments and quantity
regulation is a fundamental divide. In the simplest terms, price instruments
are usually distinguished by the fact that they involve money transfers.
They can include measures familiar from first-year law courses, such as tort
liability, as well as sin taxes, sometimes called "Pigouvian" taxes after the
economist most strongly associated with them.55 So, for example, speed
and blood-alcohol limits are common quantity regulations aimed at the
dangers of the road, while tort lawsuits and tolls are price instruments
aimed at the same problem.
Though the price/quantity dichotomy is widely accepted, and appears
in virtually any textbook on the economics of regulation, 56 it's overly
simplistic in a couple of different ways. Most importantly for my purposes,
it collapses what ought to be four categories into just two. Once more, an
archetypical price does two things that regulations usually don't: prices
reveal information about the subjective valuation of the party who chooses
to pay, and they result in the transfer of resources from one party to
another.57 As we saw, both these differences have important policy
implications.
With some reflection, though, we can see that not all transfers reveal
information, nor do all prices result in net transfers. Eminent domain
without compensation provides an example of the first: the government
takes title to property from a private landowner and gives it to someone
else. While the government can perhaps investigate the subjective cost of
the taking for the original landowner, the taking itself does nothing to reveal

55. GRUBER, supra note 32, at 135.
56. E.g., id.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 46-54.
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the landowner's preferences. Replevin and specific performance are other
familiar examples.
Rebates supply an instance of prices without transfers. Suppose that
we impose a soda tax and then rebate the proceeds equally to each
household. Families that consume the household average amount of soda
will be no richer or poorer than they were before. But each individual
retains a marginal incentive to cut back on pop because if they consume
more than average they will lose money on net. Each additional cup still
costs an extra nickel or dime. In effect, we can observe the strength of
people's preferences without transferring much between them. Louis
Kaplow extends this idea, proposing that all regulation should be evaluated
as if it were enacted together with a perfectly offsetting tax or rebate; under
his scheme, all prices are on net transferless.58
Therefore, I'll subdivide the price/quantity categories. We have
policies that transfer value and those that are what I'll call "transferless."
And then we have policies that reveal information about subjective cost or
valuation, which we can call "price," and those that don't, which I'll just
call "priceless."
Public vs. Private
If policy instruments transfer value, it may be important to know who
are the winners and losers. To simplify a bit, I'll call the two main
possibilities "private" and "public." Tort proceeds are paid directly to
victims, while tax revenues usually end up in the public fisc. There can
also be middle ground between the two categories. If tort awards are
subject to an income tax, then a portion of the judgment ends up in public
hands. Sin taxes may be set aside for the benefit of a particular group, as in
the case of the federal gasoline tax, which is mostly used for road
improvements.59 In the case of carrots, we can think of "public" and
"private" as the question of who pays, rather than who benefits. 6 ° For
instance, patents resemble tax credits for research and development, but the

B.

58. Louis KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICs 13-34 (2008).

1

do not disagree, and even agree that such perfect offsets might often be theoretically ideal. My
goal is only to consider the second-best outcomes in the absence of optimal offsets. That is, I
analyze the implementation of the price instrument in isolation from any such offsets, which so far
have not been observed in practice.
59. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 1 llth CONG., JCS-I-II, PRESENT LAW AND
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON FEDERAL EXCISE TAXES 2-10 (Joint Comm. Print 2011),

availableat https://www.jct.gov/Publications.html?func=startdown&id=3721.
60. That is not to say that governments cannot be subject to carrots and sticks.
subject deserves more detailed treatment than I can offer here.

But that
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costs of the patent are borne mostly by consumers, while tax credits empty
public coffers.61
Allocating winners and losers can dramatically affect both the
economics and politics of a policy as prior commentary has recognized.62
Economically, in most cases, it is more efficient to spread the costs of a
policy as widely as possible.63 Whether labeled a "tax" or not, the costs of
paying for someone else's benefits distort our behavior, and the welfare loss
from that distortion grows exponentially.64 To see why, think of a $1 tax on
iPhones. Not many people will switch to Android for $1, and those that do
really did not value Apple very highly, anyway. At a $50 tax, many people
are switching, and now we are changing the behavior of people who were
deeply bonded with Sint. And yet, the government raises not a dollar from
anyone who switches, which is why economists term the distortion
"deadweight loss." If we can spread the cost of a policy across more
payors, we can lower the costs each of them face, reducing deadweight
losses.
Transfers also have important effects on incentives. For instance, we
may prefer that fines be paid to the public, rather to the victims of crimes, in
order to give victims the correct set of incentives to mitigate the harm they
suffer. 65 As we will see, many commentators assume that carrots give
potential beneficiaries incentives to start doing bad deeds, so that they will
be paid to stop. But as I have pointed out elsewhere, that is less true
if it
66
turns out that the beneficiaries also mostly pay for their own carrots.
Transfers are not the only way a policy can be public or private. The
power to initiate an enforcement action, control over how it proceeds, the
costs of administering and enforcing it-all these can be divided between
public and private. These factors are significant at times, as well;
"corrective justice" tort scholars point to private control, rather than the
67
recipients of the money judgment, as a key feature of the tort system.

61. See Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND L. REV. 115, 200-07
(2003); Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive
System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 54 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2002).
62. For a review, see Galle, supra note 27, at 809-12, 840-45.
63. See A.B. Atkinson & J.E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versus Indirect
Taxation, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 55, 55-64 (1976) (explaining benefits of uniform, broad-based

taxation).
64. Id. at 56 (arguing that basing a tax on characteristics under the control of an individual
will distort the economy).
65. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 44, at 738; Donald Wittman, Liability for Harm or
Restitutionfor Benefit?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 67-68 (1984).
66. Galle, supra note 27, at 826-27.
67. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, The ConstitutionalStatus of Tort Law: Due Process and the
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 532-58 (2005) (arguing that the
basis of tort law is private property rights and the notion that individuals have personal rights to be
redressed).
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Private control over a nudge regime might complicate regulatory goals. 68
For the most part, though, I will not examine those questions closely here.
C.

Stick vs. Carrot
Once policy makers decide to rely on a price instrument, they have a
choice between rewarding or penalizing, between carrots and sticks. Both
options have similar effects on the marginal incentives of externality
producers.69 Whether producers are rewarded, or nonproducers fined,
70
giving an additional dollar saves donors money relative to not giving.
Each instrument can be priced so that the marginal cost of an additional unit
of production is equal to the marginal damage suffered by society, so that in
effect the producers internalize the full social cost of their decision. 7'
However, the two mechanisms vary in a number of other important ways.
As I have described before, which option is the better choice for a particular
policy depends largely on these other factors.7 2
Sticks are, except in unusual circumstances, the more efficient tool for
reining in the social overproduction of some negative-externality-laden
good.73 Sticks earn the government money, while carrots drain the treasury,
wasting hard-won tax revenues.74 Revenue is critical because raising taxes
is costly: in addition to paying the tax, many people will also change their
behavior to minimize taxes, causing deadweight loss.75 In addition, carrots
give producers more resources to create the unwanted good. Similarly, in
many cases, as individuals get wealthier, they demand more of the
' 76
undesirable product, a phenomenon known as the "income effect.
Carrots are also wasteful if producers plan to cut back on their activities
anyway. And overproducers who know they will be paid to curtail their
activities in the future have an incentive to begin overproducing, while the
opposite is true of sticks.

68. Michael S. Barr et al., The Case for Behaviorally Informed Regulation, in NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 27, 35-39 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009).
69. Helfand et al., supra note 23, at 277-78.
70. Id. at 278.
71. Id.

72. Galle, supra note 27, at 809-13. For a complementary framework that sometimes reaches
different conclusions from mine, see Gerrit De Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, The Rise of
Carrots and the Decline of Sticks, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 341, 360-73 (2013).
73. For development of the points in this paragraph, see Galle, supra note 27, at 813-3 1.
74. The revenue benefit of sticks depends, however, on some assumptions about how the
revenues are deployed. A. Lans Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder, EnvironmentalTaxation and
Regulation, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1471, 1497-507 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin
Feldstein eds., 2002). For development of this point, see infra section III(B)(1).
75. GRUBER, supra note 32, at 591-601.
76. Cf id. at 36 (defining income effect as higher prices causing a consumer to buy less when
all else is held constant). For example, poorer commuters may take the bus, while richer ones
may prefer to drive.

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 92:837

In contrast, carrots are more defensible for encouraging the production
of a good with positive externalities, where we would expect social
underproduction.7 7 In that case, the fact that carrot recipients have more
resources is desirable, since we want them to produce or demand more of
the good.78 On the other hand, it is still the case that the expectation of
future carrots has unwanted incentive effects, encouraging producers to
delay producing the good until the government agrees to pay them. And
carrots remain costlier, especially when factoring in the possibility that
some might altruistically produce the good without subsidy. So though
carrots are less clearly dominated by sticks in the positive externality
setting, there remains a question whether they are worth the cost.
Let me emphasize the limits of what this "choice of instruments" kind
of analysis can accomplish. The goal is to measure the relative efficacy of
each choice, given an arbitrary baseline: our world looks like this, what
should we do now? So the claim is not that sticks are always efficient, only
that they are usually more efficient than carrots, all else equal.79
D.

Ex ante/Ex post
Another potentially important policy dichotomy is the timing of the
policy lever, though I will not emphasize it much here because its
parameters are already well explored in the literature.8 ° Some incentives
pay off before the externality producer acts, and some take effect
afterwards. For example, zoning laws restrict development before it results
in unwanted burdens on neighbors, while nuisance suits impose liability
after the damage has begun.
In many cases time is irrelevant. As any 1L knows, ex post liability
regimes like tort and criminal law assume that rational actors will take
account of their expected future costs when planning their behavior. 81 So ex
post is effectively the same as ex ante, at least for rationally-forward-

77. Id. at 43-53 (noting that an unregulated market tends to underproduce goods with positive

externalities).
78. Galle, supra note 27, at 832.
79. See Helfand et al., supra note 23, at 270 (noting that a goal of economic analysis is
usually to identify the welfare effects of a policy in comparison to its alternatives); cf Daniel
Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U.
CHI. L. REV. 405, 415 (1997) (explaining that departures from the status quo can be analyzed
without attributing any special normative status to existing rules).
80. For more extensive treatment, see Brian Galle, Myopia, Fiscal Federalism, and
Unemployment Insurance: Time to Reform UI Financing 5-18 (Bos. Coll. Law Sch., Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 265, 2012), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=2031728.
81. Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Actors, in THE LAW &

ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 268, 272 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds.,
2005).
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looking actors.82 Information, myopia, and liquidity concerns can all
disrupt this equivalence.83
E. A Summary So Far
By this point we already have many of the tools we need to compare,
say, soda taxes against the New York beverage limits. We now see that
many of the criticisms of the limits are really complaints that New York
chose a priceless, transferless, and mostly private policy over a priced,
public transfer. More generally, we can describe many policy instruments
as a combination of the factors we've seen, as in Figure 2. Figure 2 actually
does not depict the ex ante/ex post dimension, but readers can think of this
page as the ex ante boxes, and then simply don their imaginary 3-D glasses
and picture an identical set of boxes extending into the third dimension to
represent ex post. The examples given, though, mix ex ante and ex post.
Figure 2: Components of Conventional Policy Instruments
Carrots
Coasean Transfers
Transfer

Sticks

Price

4-O

Transfer

4

4T"TarJIncenhtve/ /

Priceless

82. Of course, time is money, so expost liability must be greater at the time it is imposed than
a comparable ex ante incentive, such as a Pigouvian tax; the present discounted value of each
alternative should be identical ex ante.
83. Galle, supra note 80, at 15-18.
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F.

The New Regulation: Nudges, Defaults, and "Surprising"Effects
While we have seen much of the story, there remain important senses
in which something like New York's soda policy differs from traditional
regulation. As readers likely know, Sunstein and Thaler call these kinds of
policies "nudges," and offer a long list of examples; for instance, they
suggest painting roads to encourage more cautious driving and if that fails
making organ donation the default choice on drivers' licenses.84
1. What's a Nudge?-For Sunstein, Thaler, and other proponents, two
factors distinguish their ideas from more familiar approaches: nudges are
policies whose effects are "surprising" and "asymmetric. ,,85 For example,
classic rational-choice economic theory predicts that the default savings rate
chosen by our employers should not affect how much we choose to save for
retirement. Filling out a sheet of paper to change our plan takes ten
minutes, and might be worth tens of thousands of dollars in the long term.
Yet much evidence suggests that defaults matter a great deal: that is the
surprising part.86 The "asymmetry" is that the impact of the form is not
uniform; some people are much more affected by having to fill out a form
87
than others.
A nudge, then, replaces traditional motivators, such as cash or jail
time, with surprising and asymmetric incentives.
If we know that
individuals are slow to switch away from a default choice initially made for
them, government can use defaults in place of commands.88 Similarly,
minor obstacles such as having to fill out a form or wait in a line can, at
times, replace prescriptive regulation. 89 To the extent that the framing and
presentation of information influences how we choose, government can

84. See THALER & SuNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 83-102, 172-84, 231-39, 257-68. See Russell
Korobkin, Libertarian Welfarism, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1651, 1662-64 (2009), for a pithy summary
of the available tools.
85. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 85-86, 252-54; Camerer et al., supra note 17,
at 1222 (arguing that paternalistic policies are justified when there is asymmetric information).
86. Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings
Behavior,J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2007, at 81, 83-84.
87. See id. at 100-01; Chetty et al., supra note 14 (manuscript at 37-38).
88. Nudge proponents have mostly focused on internalities, but some scholars have extended
their work to externalities or other regulatory goals as well. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 52, at
2086 (arguing that nudges can be used in the context of negative externalities); Anuj C. Desai,
LibertarianPaternalism,Externalities,and the "Spirit of Liberty ": How Thaler and Sunstein are
Nudging Us Toward an "Overlapping Consensus," 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 263, 270 (2011)
(discussing choice architecture in the context of negative externalities); Korobkin, supra note 84,
at 1653 (stating that nudges can be used in the context of public goods by encouraging greater
production of public goods); Matthew A. Smith & Michael S. McPherson, Nudging for Equality:
Values in LibertarianPaternalism,61 ADMiN. L. REv. 323, 335-39 (2009) (urging the use of the
nudge concept to promote equality).
89. Brian Galle & Manuel Utset, Is Cap-and-Trade Fair to the Poor? Shortsighted
Households and the Timing of Consumption Taxes, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 33, 84-87 (2010).
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influence the public towards more desirable outcomes without the need for
law enforcement. 90
These two features have important normative bite for nudge
proponents. They argue that the objective burdens of overcoming a nudge
in many cases are small. 9' Of course, in the moment that individuals face
the nudge-when they are waiting on hold as The Girlfrom Ipanema plays
tinnily through their phone's speaker-its costs appear too large to bear. So
the claim that nudges are different depends partly on an assumption about
the proper measure of individuals' utility: evidently we should count costs
and benefits according to the perspective the individual would take in a
temporally remote, "reflective" setting.92 Seen from this point of view, the
cost of waiting on the phone for a few minutes should look tiny.
Secondly, and less controversially, nudges differ from standard
regulation in their ability to more closely approximate people's real
preferences. Traditionally, critics of regulation have claimed that uniform
government rules aimed at correcting people's own mistakes will
necessarily impose a one-size-fits-all regime, forcing some people to
change for the worse. 93 Social security, for instance, can be criticized as a
form of forced savings that may reduce the subjective
welfare of those who
94
prefer to consume all their income immediately.
Nudge defenders argue that asymmetry mitigates this problem because
those who feel strongly about their own choices can easily overcome the
government's default. 95 Although defenders acknowledge that for some
people nudges can be hard to overcome, they suggest that asymmetric
regulation is most defensible in those cases where the personality traits that
make nudges tough to fight are the same traits that produce the behaviors
the government is combating. 96 Impatient people won't opt out of default
savings plans, but the impatient are also the most likely to be saving too

90. Camerer et al., supra note 17, at 1230-37.
91. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 252-54; Camerer et al., supra note 17, at 1219,
1222; see also Ayres, supra note 52, at 2087 (describing costs of sticky defaults as "intermediate"
between commands and free contract).
92. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 12; Sunstein & Thaler, LibertarianPaternalism,
supra note 17, at 1191. A more developed version of this argument is Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency
of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REv. 229, 237-84 (1998). But cf Camerer et al., supra note 17, at
1253-54 (suggesting that nudges are preferable to traditional paternalistic regulation because of
"uncertainty" about whether consumer choices are really mistakes).
93. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Exchange, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer
Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REv. 803, 806-07 (2008); Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 18, at 909-10.
94. Theodore R. Groom & John B. Shoven, Deregulatingthe PrivatePension System, in THE
EVOLvING PENSION SYSTEM 123, 126 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2005).
95. Ayres, supra note 52, at 2091-92; Camerer et al., supra note 17, at 1222.
96. Camerer et al., supra note 17, at 1225-26; see also Allcott et al., supra note 12, at 2, 23
(discussing the correlation between susceptibility to defaults and propensity to suffer harm).
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little. Therefore, even if nudges are costly for some people, these are
97
generally the people who on net benefit from that cost.
While prior nudge proposals generally do not rely on dollars, we can
also imagine some surprising price instruments. When the metro D.C. area
adopted a five-cent tax on plastic grocery bags, grocery-bag usage
plummeted.9 8 Consumers switched to alternatives that often were more
expensive than plastic, even after accounting for the five-cent savings. 99 So
it seems that it was not price alone that made the "bag tax" so effective.
Commentators suggest that the tax might have provided new information to
consumers about the harms of plastic bags. 10 0 Or it might have triggered a
"norms cascade" in which it became shameful to be one of those peoplethe people who did not care about whether their trash would strangle a
hapless sea bird. 1°1 Other monetary incentives may be especially effective
10 2
because of the way they are timed and framed.
In short, it seems as though we could expand our earlier set of boxes to
include the possibility of surprising forms of any kind of policy tool. I
illustrate this expanded universe with Figure 3, below. For some combinations, real-world examples are scarce, suggesting some new frontiers of
policy experiments.

97. Camerer et al., supra note 17, at 1222.
98. Tatiana A. Homonoff, Can Small Incentives Have Large Effects? The Impact of Taxes
Versus Bonuses on Disposable Bag Use 3, 6 (Mar. 27, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available
at https://appam.confex.com/appam/2013/webprogram/Paper6746.html.
99. Id.

100. Id.
101. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 947-50
(1996) (explaining the concept of norms cascade and the potential government role in it).
102. AYRES, supra note 8, at 43, 53; see Kevin C. Volpp et al., FinancialIncentive-Based
Approaches for Weight Loss, 300 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2631, 2636 (2008) (describing
"supercharged" financial incentives).
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Figure 3: Components of Policy Instruments
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2. Why Do Nudges Work?-In order to do any serious policy analysis
of surprising instruments, we'll need to understand what makes them
effective. As I'll show in a bit, the psychological mechanisms that underlie
different forms of nudge can translate into sharply varying social welfare
implications for their widespread usage.
Nudges depend on humans' psychological foibles. Data show that we
are overwhelmingly creatures of the present, and only through exercises of
our limited pool of willpower can we force ourselves to take sufficient
account of the future. 10 3 Relatedly, we tend to focus our attention on facts

103. For overviews of the literature, see Fennell, supra note 50, at 1375-94, and Shane
Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, in ADVANCES IN
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICs 162, 166-79 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004).
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that are readily available to us or on items in plain sight, reacting
automatically and emotionally to those immediate stimuli-mental
processes Kahneman calls "system one." 10 4 Only with some effort do we
turn our attention to the distant and the hidden, and engage our reasoning
powers-Kahneman's "system two"-to reach better decisions. 0 5 We
"anchor" on information we've already received and interpret new data
selectively to fit with what we already know or want to be true. 10 6 In all of
these areas evidence demonstrates10 7 that individuals vary considerably in
their susceptibility to the behavior.
These tendencies form the backbone of most surprising interventions.
For instance, scholars who have studied "sticky defaults" argue that defaults
are surprisingly persistent because many of us assign too much weight to
the present burden of having to ponder finances and too little weight to the
distant future benefits of savings. °8 Thus, policy makers who want to
encourage savings by those who are "impatient" in this way can encourage
employers to set the default to a high level of savings, rather than the
prevailing zero or very low levels.
Other interventions employ our tendency to rely on system one
processes. Choice architecture, for instance, aims to present us with options
that we will find instinctively appealing. 10 9 New York City's new Active
Design Guidelines are a literal example, encouraging builders to make stairs
easy to find and elevators difficult, so as to encourage workers to climb to
their offices.' 10 Sunstein and Thaler mention Chicago's use of lines on the
street to1 make drivers feel they are driving too fast and to reflexively slow
down. I
New York's beverage limits draw on both impatience and
attentiveness. Many studies show that consumers tend to eat or drink
whatever is in front of them.112 In one famous study, researchers found that
consumers will eat as much soup as it takes to empty their bowl, even if the
researchers are secretly pumping more soup into the bottom. 13 Items

104. Daniel Kahneman, Maps ofBounded Rationality:Psychology for Behavioral Economics,
93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1451-57 (2003).
105. Id. at 1467-69.
106. JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 203-24 (4th ed. 2008).
107. Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Self-Awareness and Self-Control, in TIME AND
DECISION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 217,

218-20 (George Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003).
108. Benartzi & Thaler, supra note 86, at 99-100 (pointing to evidence that education failed
to change savings rates but that willpower-focused interventions did).
109. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 3.
110. NYC CENTER FOR ACTIVE DESIGN, ACTIVE DESIGN GUIDELINES 70-81 (2010),
availableat http://www.nyc.gov/html/ddc/html/design/active-design.shtml.
111. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 37-39.
112. See sources cited supra note 10.
113. WANSINK, supra note 10, at 47-52.
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placed in front of us are more tempting, and more immediately available to
our mind, than the distant benefits of restraint. 1 14 The burden of going back
for another serving also triggers our tendency to put off future benefits, and
since impatience is correlated with obesity," 5 this burden is largest for
those who are most likely to overconsume. New York's nudge is to shrink
the portion size, which should thereby also diminish consumption.
Importantly for my later analysis, evidence so far also suggests that
some of us are more self-aware of our psychological failings than others.
Consider the example of the mutual bank. Mutuals offer credit cards with
relatively higher interest rates but promise "no hidden fees." 1 6 That
combination of features seems most plausibly aimed at customers who
117
know their own tendency to fall for the tricks played by other banks. 8
Mutuals command a small sliver of the credit market, however."
Similarly, many households report that they let the government keep too
much in tax withholding each year so that they will not face the temptation
to spend that money too soon-and then, ironically, some of these same
households later pay very high fees to get access to their money a few
weeks early."l 9 Though other interpretations are possible, a reasonable
inference is that our understanding of our own frailty, even if present, is
often imperfect.
III. Choosing the Best Instrument
We're now fully prepared to compare a wide array of different
policies. Again, most scholars so far agree that what they call price
instruments-what in Figure 3 would fall into the stick-price-transfer
boxes-dominate other options. 120 In this Part, I will argue that several of
the presumed advantages of transfers and prices may be less important than
has previously been understood.' 2 1 While in some cases my claim depends
114. Seeid.
115. E.g., Shinsuke Ikeda et al., Hyperbolic Discounting,the Sign Effect, and the Body Mass
Index, 29 J. HEALTH EcON. 268, 268 (2010); Charles J. Courtemanche et al., Impatience,
Incentives, and Obesity 17-26 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17483,
2011), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w 17483.
116. Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Consumer Biases and Mutual Ownership, 105 J. PUB.
ECON. 39, 45-50 (2013).
117. Id. at48.
118. Id. at45.
119. Michael S. Barr & Jane K. Dokko, Third-Party Tax Administration: The Case of Lowand Moderate-Income Households, 5 J. EMPIRICAL L. STuD. 963, 971-78 (2008).
120. Glaeser, supra note 20, at 150; see also sources cited supra note 52.
121. For simplicity's sake, when describing the effects of price instruments I mostly assume
here that individuals respond rationally to the instrument. Obviously that is not necessarily so,
especially in the internality context. For discussion of price instruments with irrational agents, see
Brian Galle, Carrots, Sticks, and Salience, 66 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) available at
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp/493/, and Garth Heutel, Optimal Policy Instruments for
Externality-Producing Durable Goods Under Time Inconsistency (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
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on the potentially surprising nature of some transferless and priceless
instruments, in other cases even conventional regulation is a better option
than economists suggest.
A.

Prices or Priceless?
Once more, commentators argue that price instruments best their
priceless competitors by providing better information. 22 In particular, from
a societal standpoint we would like to pay the least possible to get to the
right level of externalities, but it's hard to know how to do that. For
example, if Grungefirm can cut the first unit of emissions for $100, and
Sparklefirm can clean up for only $80, it makes more sense to ask Sparkle
first.123 The problem is that government usually doesn't know the marginal
cost of cleanup for each firm. Each firm has strong incentives to hide its
capacity; if Sparkle can fool society into demanding reductions from
Grunge instead, it saves $80. The opposite is true if we promise rewards
for clean production: there,
each firm wants to pretend to be the cheapest,
24
rather than the costliest. 1
Prices give externality producers incentives to reveal their private cost
structure. 125 If we set taxes at $81 per unit of pollution, then Sparkle will
spend $80 to clean up, saving $1. Grunge keeps polluting. Assuming that
each is operating rationally, we can infer that Sparkle's marginal costs are
less than $81 and Grunge's are more.1 26 Same thing if we offer a bonus: if
Sparkle accepts an $81 reward for reducing emissions, it must be the case
that it costs Sparklefirm less than that to clean up its act.
This account has two potential flaws, one sketched previously by
Jacob Nussim and another I'll lay out for the first time here. Nussim
suggests that price instruments do not actually economize on information
because they fail to reveal information about the least-cost avoider.127 I'll

Research, Working Paper No. 17083, 2011), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn
?abstract id=1854185.
122. See, e.g., Fullerton et al., supra note 45, at 430.
123. If the marginal cost of cleanup is increasing, as seems likely to be the case, then at some

point it will become cheaper to switch to Grunge. At equilibrium, the marginal costs of
remediation should therefore be equal at all firms. Any other result produces unnecessary social
costs.

Robert Stavins, Environmental Economics, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF

ECONOMICS 882, 882-83 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).
124. Competitive bidding is one classic solution to this problem, but that route has many
complications, as well. JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN
PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION 307-40 (1993).

125. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 46, at 4.
126. Of course, finms that are aware of the government's strategy can strategically conceal
information. See Galle, supra note 27, at 822-23, 826-27, for discussion of that scenario.
127. See Jacob Nussim, Information Costs of Externality-Control Instruments 7-10 (Dec. 9,
2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2395152.
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add that, even if price instruments do reveal all the information the
regulator needs, in many cases priceless instruments could do just as well.
Nussim's point depends on the argument, familiar from tort theory,
that sometimes it is victims who should change their behavior, not injurers.
If the farmer can move her grain away from the fiery train tracks at a cost of
only $50, while it would cost millions to relocate the tracks, society is better
1 28
off if the farmer has to move (setting aside distributive considerations).
Thus the correct price for a price instrument is not, in our earlier terms, the
marginal social damage but rather the lesser of the marginal social damage
or the victim's cost of avoiding that damage. 129 If the price for the
instrument is set at MSD, we won't learn much about victims' costs; those
who can avoid the harm for less than the damage they suffer will do so, but
we don't know how much less it costs them.
Kaplow and Shavell suggest, albeit fairly indirectly, a possible answer,
though their focus is on the costs of injurers, not victims.1 30 Suppose that

instead of jumping directly to MSD, the government slowly phases in its
new penalty over time. We then can observe the behavior of victims as the
price changes. Do victims avoid injury when the damage to them is $40?131
When it's $60? When it's $110? Nussim emphasizes that his argument is
for the "static" case, 132 and perhaps this is why: in a dynamic setting, the
policy maker can experiment with different values, and use the resulting
observations to infer both producer and victim cost schedules.
If that is true, however, it implies that the government need not rely on
price instruments. Or, more precisely, once the government has used price
instruments experimentally, it can then switch to priceless regulation. What
if the priceless instrument is superior in all respects to the price instrument,
except for the fact that the priceless instrument cannot accurately account
for private costs?

33

Why not gather that information, then use the more

effective instrument going forward? If private costs change over time, the
government could periodically introduce small-scale experiments to
recalibrate.

128. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 135-97 (1970).
129. Or, putting this point another way, the true MSD is the lesser of harm or avoidance costs.
130. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 46, at 6 (suggesting use of varying tax schedules over
time to reveal private cost information of externality producers). I am grateful to Louis for
pointing out that this same argument can apply to the question of victims' costs.
131. Note that we are assuming that the government has ready access to the MSD "schedule,"
or at least to the expected MSD schedule. That is, the government can draw the MSD and
producer's cost curves. It therefore can trace a line from the intersection of the cost of the price
instrument and the producer's cost curve, and find the corresponding point on the MSD curve.
That would allow it to infer the damage suffered by the average victim.

132. Nussim, supra note 127, at 7-8.
133. Cf Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 44, at 1119 (arguing that, if not for information
problems, property rules would usually be preferable).
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No doubt it would be complex and costly to switch all of society from
one regulatory instrument to another, but such large-scale disruptions would
often be unnecessary. Unless every externality producer is perfectly
unique, information gathered about some producers will very likely be
relevant for others. Carbon mitigation costs may vary dramatically between
different "generations" of power plant, but those using similar technologies
will probably have similar costs. So small-scale experiments-for instance,
34
in state "laboratories"-can provide data for later nationwide expansions. 1
Another experimental method for replicating the informational benefit
of a price instrument is to find what we could call the "shadow price" of its
priceless alternative. Though many commentators seem to assume that
quantity regulations are something like an absolute command,1 35 more
realistically any form of punishment can be priced and used in an optimal
deterrence framework. 136 This shadow price can, like a traditional price, be
set at the optimal level by matching it to the marginal social cost of the
internality or externality.137
Social science should be able to estimate a person or firm's dollarequivalent responsiveness to a priceless instrument.1 38 Suppose that 50% of
the population saves at the government's target savings rate when they are
automatically enrolled in a retirement plan. To measure the subjective
"cost" of opting out of the default, we can set up a parallel experiment in
which we measure what dollar amount would produce an equal 50%
participation rate. That equivalent dollar amount is the shadow price of the
134. But note that this likely requires carefully directed experiments rather than unguided
state policy making. See Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 929,
946-47 (2011) (noting that "[flederalism . .. does not easily facilitate a scientific approach to
experimentation"); Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratoriesof Democracy? Policy Innovation
in DecentralizedGovernments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1368-70 (2009) (summarizing evidence that
state "experiments" fail to meet the needs of real experimentation).
135. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1535 (1984) ("If
officials obtain the necessary information and create an optimal legal standard, then private
persons will be required to obey the legal standard upon pain of suffering the sanction attached to
it."); Hepburn, supra note 45, at 241 ("Current speed limits are clearly a very crude approximation
to 'optimal' speed limits[,] ... where travel in excess of the speed limit is possible provided a fine
is paid.").
136. See Becker, supra note 22, at 182-83 (using punishment, among other variables, in an
optimal deterrence framework to determine the socially optimal levels at which "crime does not
pay"); Rasmusen, supra note 22, at 524-27, 538 (incorporating the expected cost of "stigma" into
his optimal deterrence framework).
137. Indeed, Kaplow and Shavell rely on the notion that regulatory commands can be
interchangeable with prices elsewhere in their argument for price instruments. Kaplow and
Shavell, supra note 46, at 9. They critique the traditional view that quantity regulation, and only
quantity regulation, can create a "hard cap" or mandatory limit on externalities by arguing that
sharp price increments can have similar deterrent effects. Id. at 7-10.
138. For a real-world example, see Marianne Bertrand et al., What's Advertising Content
Worth? Evidence from a Consumer Credit Marketing Field Experiment, 125 Q.J. ECON. 263
(2010) (comparing effects of framing and price changes on likelihood of consumer borrowing and
estimating a value for each framing technique).
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nudge. Alternately, we could run the two experiments together by setting
the regulation in place and allowing those subject to it to buy their way out,
as in the famous case of the Civil War draft. Draftees were allowed to pay
someone else to serve in their place, providing
evidence of the subjective
39
parties.1
both
for
service
military
of
cost
To be sure, these shadow price measures are imprecise and may vary
widely across individuals. 140 For that reason, some criminal law scholars
seem skeptical that alternatives to fines, such as jail or shaming, can be fit
seamlessly into the optimal deterrence framework.
Variations in
individuals' vulnerability to harms in prison, in their adaptability to adverse
circumstances, and in their subjective experiences of14punishment can make
it difficult to determine an average "cost" of jail time. 1
I don't want to diminish these criticisms, but in many respects they can
also be said of instruments denominated in dollars. 142 For example,
individuals can also adapt to their financial situation. Just as those in prison
can experience "hedonic adaptation" in which they find the experience of
punishment is not as severe as they expected, 143 so too can households grow
accustomed to their wealth. Researchers who study happiness argue
144
fiercely over whether greater wealth correlates with greater happiness.
Hedonic adaptation to household wealth levels seems at least a plausible
explanation for why it is so difficult to demonstrate this correlation: humans
can find joy in whatever we have and perhaps grow blasd with familiar
wealth. 14
139. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT'S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 76-77, 80 (2009). As

the draft example also infamously illustrates, an information difficulty for price instruments is that
dollars do not have the same value for everyone. Id. at 82-83.
140. See Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and
Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233, 240-43 (1990) (discussing limits on tools for translating
"hedonic" preferences into dollar units); Hill, supra note 18, at 453 (giving examples of goods or
taxes that provide different values to different individuals).
141. See John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment,76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1046-55
(2009); Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182,
187-96 (2009). For a different take on the relevance of these data, see Dan Markel & Chad
Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF.
L. REV. 907, 959-64, 967-73 (2010).
142. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 29, at 735-36 (arguing that the impact of
psychological or social factors may be more predictable than the effect of prices).
143. Bronsteen et al., supranote 141, at 1048-49.
144. See Richard A. Easterlin et al., The Happiness-Income Paradox Revisited, 107 PROC.
NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 22,463, 22,463-67 (2010) (positing that over the long term, an increase in
happiness does not follow an increase in wealth and critiquing alternative findings); Mike
Morrison et al., Subjective Well-Being and National Satisfaction: Findings from a Worldwide
Survey, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 166, 169-70 (2011) (finding that national satisfaction has a greater
effect on overall life satisfaction for lower income individuals than it does on higher income
individuals, partially compensating for the satisfaction discrepancies created by wealth
disparities).
145. Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1363, 138990 (2004).
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In addition, dollars could be less predictable than other forms of
regulation to the extent that they are more or less salient. Of course, an
incentive is usually only effective when people are aware of it. A growing
body of real-world evidence suggests that consumers and other actors are
not always fully attentive to dollar prices. 146 Math, and our understandable
desire to avoid the pain of having to think about it, may help explain why
people neglect prices. 147 Presumably that would be less of an obstacle for
regulations that confront individuals with experiences or sensations rather
than numbers. On the flip side, some researchers also find that dollardenominated incentives are at times so visceral that they crowd out other,
less tangible motivations,148 which could make dollar-denominated sticks
more salient than policy makers intend.
On the other hand, price instruments may retain their advantage in
situations where experiments of the kind I have suggested are impractical.
Suppose, for example, that landowners have a highly varying and
idiosyncratic attachment to their property. If protecting that attachment is
an important policy goal, price instruments might be more likely to achieve
it. 149

B.

Transfer or No Transfer? Public or Private?

Another putative key advantage of taxes over regulation, or of fines
over prison, is that in each case the transfer of money produces a better
outcome than pure punishment or imposition.' 5° As I will argue in this
subpart, these claims may well be less true of nudges and other surprising
forms of regulation. They also are less accurate when transfers flow not to

146. See Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV.
1145, 1153-56 (2009); Aradhna Krishna et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Impact of Price
Presentationon PerceivedSavings, 78 J. RETAILING 101, 101-18 (2002).
147. See Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 81-85 (2009) for a discussion
of the uncertain basis for the low salience of some taxes.
148. John Condry & James Chambers, Intrinsic Motivation and the Process of Learning, in
THE HIDDEN COSTS OF REWARDS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN
MOTIVATION 61, 61-66 (Mark R. Lepper & David Greene eds., 1978); see also Stephanie J.
Byram, Cognitive and Motivational Factors Influencing Time Prediction, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 216, 233 (1997) (reporting that financial incentives for speed of performance
exacerbate biased performance).
149. Kaplow and Shavell suggest that when idiosyncratic valuation is high, property rules are
superior to liability rules. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 44, at 759-63. But that argument deals
with the special situation of takings, id., which actually more closely resemble quantity regulation
than price instruments: the initial owner has no choice about whether to sell the property, and so
although there is a "price" that the government pays, that price reveals nothing about the owner's
preferences. In my framework, compensated takings are priceless and (to the extent that
compensation is imperfect) partial transfers.
150. See Helfand et al., supra note 23, at 287 (arguing that price-based instruments like
effluent taxes are more efficient than quantity-based standards); see also Korobkin, supra note 84,
at 1668-69 (asserting that a system allowing for trading ensures a better maximization of utility
than an imposition of a one-size-fits-all standard).
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the public coffers but instead to other private parties.
And prior
commentators seem not to have considered the possibility that transferless
instruments may be superior to transfers in the case of carrots-that is, if
the transfer would be to the externality producer, rather than away.
1. Of Transfers and Nudges.-To understand fully the claim that
transfers are superior to transferless instruments, we must take a short
detour into the economics of taxation. Recall that virtually all taxes
produce deadweight loss, or economic waste resulting from changes in
actors' behavior in response to the tax. But computing the net loss of a
Pigouvian tax or other transfer is a bit complicated, although in the case of
externalities it has now been thoroughly examined by economists.' 5'
The welfare effects of the stick transfer are a combination of several
factors. Like any tax on a specific commodity, the transfer changes
people's decisions about what goods to put in their market basket,
producing deadweight lOSS.' 52 It can also reduce their "real" returns to
labor. That is, when laborers decide whether to get out of bed and go to
work, they implicitly are deciding whether the utility payoff of their salary
is worth the opportunity cost of more pillow time. Since taxes on goods
reduce the utility payoff from salary, economists typically predict that a
consumption tax will also affect this labor/leisure decision; this effect is
sometimes called the "tax-interaction" effect because it is compounded in
the presence of existing taxes on labor itself.'5 3
In the case of Pigouvian taxes or other transfer instruments, the funds
54
can be "recycled" by using them to cut other, distortionary taxes.
Depending on how well that recycling is targeted, the gains from offsetting
other taxes may or may not exceed the deadweight losses the transfer
produces. 155 And, of course, when consumers switch away from the taxed

151. For an accessible overview, see Parry & Oates, supra note 23, at 604-10, and for a more
technical summary, see Bovenberg & Goulder, supra note 74, at 1486-507. Few previous
commentators have examined the efficiency of a Pigouvian tax for intemalities, or harms we do to
ourselves. The major exception is Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes, 90 J.

PUB. ECON. 1825, 1834-35 (2006), who omit consideration of the effects of the tax on labor
supply. As I show here, that can be a major factor in the efficiency of the tax.
152. For instance, suppose Massachusetts taxes orange things but not pink ones. I prefer
oranges to grapefruit. When I shop in Massachusetts, though, I might buy grapefruit to avoid the
orange tax. My utility is lower, and Boston has no more money in its treasury. That is
deadweight loss from a differential tax on consumption goods.
153. Parry & Oates, supra note 23, at 605-06. It is also likely that there are tax-interaction
effects for taxes on capital, but these have not been thoroughly explored in the existing literature.
154. Id. at 606-07.
155. See Bovenberg & Goulder, supra note 74 (concluding that "small" environmental taxes
offset the labor tax increase, whereas "large" environmental taxes do not offset the increased labor
tax burden and lead both to a reduction in real wages and a drop in employment). Of course,
revenues could also be used for new government programs rather than to reduce taxes. One way
to think about why we focus on the cost of raising revenues instead of the benefit of these
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good, they reduce harmful externalities for others. It might be helpful to
think of the various effects as the terms of a simple equation:
U,=E-L-C+R.
That is, the utility effect of the transfer includes E, externality gains;
losses from the tax-interaction effect on labor, L; losses from
changes in
156
consumption choices, C; and gains from revenue recycling, R.
Recall, too, that environmental economists argue that even regulations
that do not explicitly put a price on behavior can also cause deadweight
losses, especially when those regulations are enacted in the context of an
existing income tax.' 57 But unlike the transfer, the regulation does not bring
in any new funds. In effect, the regulation gives us a utility result:
Ur=E-L-C.
Prior commentators therefore argue that a tax is unambiguously better
by the amount of the quantity, R. 158 That is the logic that seems to be
motivating critics who complain that New York's soda-cup default is a
worse policy than a soda tax.
A critical assumption in this line of argument is that the labor-supply
effects of the transfer and transferless policies are identical. In many
instances that assumption is perfectly defensible. If the government has
accurately determined the optimal quantity of the extemality, presumably
the cost of achieving that optimal level of production is identical under
either instrument. Rational actors will account for that cost when they
decide how hard to work.
An example here could be helpful. Let's take a soda drinker, Albert.
The City of Novum Eboracum wants to reduce the burden of Albert's future
health costs on its budget and determines that the optimal soda tax for
Albert is $.50 per centiliter, which results in five liters of soda consumption
on average. At $250 per week, that tax will likely significantly reduce

programs is that the benefits would be the same no matter how we paid for them. So the only
variable is how socially costly it is to acquire the money to fund them.
156. This equation follows from, but simplifies, the calculations in Bovenberg & Goulder,
supra note 74, at 1486-503. In my view the assumption that there are distortions in the
commodities market, modeled here as the quantity C, should be controversial. The claim seems to
be that consumers have clearly formed preferences prior to imposition of the tax and that the tax
distorts these. But arguably the tax itself shapes or helps consumers to revise preferences, as was
reportedly the case of the Washington, D.C.-area tax on shopping bags. Cf Barr et al., supra note
68, at 28-29 (arguing that preferences are constructed during decision processes). If so, it isn't
clear that this effect should count as a distortion. Rather than take a definitive position on the
question, I will simply assume for now that these changes should count as welfare losses.
157. Bovenberg & Goulder, supra note 74, at 1502.
158. See sources cited supra note 52.
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Albert's real returns to labor, and therefore figure prominently in his
decision how hard to work. Alternately, the City can make obtaining soda
annoying or unpleasant, such as by selling it only in very small containers.
By definition, the shadow price of the annoyance, when it is set optimally,
is $250-the exact amount of annoyance that Albert experiences when he
pays the optimal soda tax. If Albert rationally anticipates the irritation of
going back to the store for many tiny bottles of soda, that, too, should figure
into his labor-leisure decision.
Except that we know from psychological research that Albert actually
is unlikely to anticipate his future subjective costs of complying with the
City's nudge. System one processes are automatic, not deliberative.' 59 As
such, their operation can be difficult to notice in real time, and even more
difficult to predict. 16
Nudges that rely on our tendency to draw on
automatic behavior, such as placing healthy food close to the cash register
or using visceral, emotionally charged images rather than detailed
16 1
information, affect us without triggering conscious thought.
Unsurprisingly, many studies find that consumers are extremely poor at
predicting their own susceptibility to private firms' use of these kinds of
62
techniques. 1
Thus, Albert may not even anticipate that the nudge will change his
behavior. Recall that portion size affects consumption exactly because we
don't think about how much we're consuming, instead letting ourselves be
guided by whatever we're presented with. 163 Reducing the size of a soda
159. Kahneman, supra note 104, at 1450-51.
160. See Roland Brnabou & Jean Tirole, Self-Knowledge and Self-Regulation: An Economic
Approach, in I THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS 137, 137-38 (Isabelle Brocas &
Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2003) (summarizing the authors' findings that individuals may not know
"what actions they would take in a given situation until the very moment when they actually
experience it"); George Loewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? PredictingFuture
Feelings, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 85, 92-98 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1999) (discussing how people consistently overestimate their own
willpower and often inadequately predict how they will act in an excited state); see also
Kahneman, supra note 104, at 1451 ("The operations of System 1 are fast, automatic, effortless,
associative, and often emotionally charged; they are also governed by habit, and are therefore
difficult to control or modify.").
161. See THALER& SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 20-22.
162. See, e.g., Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, ContractDesign and Self-Control:
Theory and Evidence, 119 Q.J. ECON. 353, 364 (2004) (noting that consumers often choose
contracts with initial discounts, such as low credit interest, more often than they anticipate, even
though these contracts eventually lapse into greatly augmented interest rates and profit for the
issuing firm); Sha Yang et al., Unrealistic Optimism in Consumer Credit Card Adoption, 28 J.
ECON. PSYCHOL. 170, 181 (2007) (concluding that consumers with unrealistic and self-serving
optimism regarding future borrowing tend to prefer credit cards with features that are not in their
best interest and are thus targeted customers for lending institutions).
163. See sources cited supra note 10. However, individuals may respond to nudges after they
experience them. Some evidence suggests that nudged food consumers compensate for healthier
choices by eating unhealthier foods afterwards. See Matteo M. Galizzi, Label, Nudge or Tax? A
Review of Health PoliciesforRisky Behaviours, I J. PUB. HEALTH RES. 14, 16 (2012).
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portion could diminish consumption without drinkers even really noticing,
let alone changing their work habits in response.
Researchers are less clear on our ability to predict our own willpower.
Though our exact predictions are poor, those who struggle with temptation
usually know it and take steps accordingly. 64 Nonetheless, if surprising
regulations often work because we are unwilling to exert the mental effort
to overcome them, it seems unlikely we would exert the mental effort to
compute and adjust our labor supply in response. 65 Others may refuse to
face the fact of their own failings in
order to preserve their self-esteem or to
1 66
reduce feelings of internal conflict.
On the other hand, the prediction that nudges will have little effect on
labor supply depends to some extent on the assumption that labor supply is
a system two process-that we think and plan about how hard to work.
What if labor supply instead is itself a fairly instinctual process, where we
force ourselves out of bed each morning based on some gut sense of how
rewarding work will be? Perhaps Albert has some vague sense of
dissatisfaction with the returns of his salary, without being able to identify
that it is related to his newly healthy diet. No empirical work has yet
examined the labor-supply effects of nudges, and so this seems to be a
critical area for future research.
In any event, it is at least theoretically plausible that surprising policy
instruments could have surprisingly low effects on labor supply, relative to
more traditional transfers. In the most dramatic cases, labor effects could
be negligible. Then it would be ambiguous whether transfers are superior;
in terms of the earlier equations, transfers are superior only where R > L:
[ U = E - L - C + R ] > < [ U, =E- C].
That is, since these forms of transferless instruments eliminate labor
distortions but bring in no revenues, they are the better choice when the
transfer's labor distortions reduce welfare by more than its revenues
increase welfare. 167 As it turns out, the relationship between R and L
depends on whether transfers are public or private. Let's turn there next.

164. See Nava Ashraf et al., Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence from a Commitment
Savings Product in the Philippines, 121 QJ. ECON. 635, 636-37 (2006); Ted O'Donoghue &
Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103, 105 (1999).
165. Cf Patrick Bolton & Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Thinking Ahead: The Decision Problem,
76 REV. ECON. STUD. 1205, 1205-08 (2009) (modeling costs of deliberating about future decision
settings).
166. See Roy F. Baumeister, The Self, in I THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 680,
688-92 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).
167. A key assumption here is that the efficacy of the nudge-type intervention, represented
here by the E term, can approximate the efficacy of other tools. For skepticism on that point, see
Ryan Bubb & Richard E. Pildes, How BehavioralEconomics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 70-73), available at http://papers.ssm.conmsol3/papers
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2. Public or Private Transfers?-We saw earlier that not all sticks
transfer money to the government, nor does the public fisc pay for all
carrots. 68 As prior commentators note, this shift can have important
welfare implications. 169 Others have not recognized, though, that these
welfare consequences generally weaken the case for transfer instruments.
Transfers to private parties are typically not as efficient as transfers to the
government, and so this diminishes the advantage of the transfer relative to
a transferless policy. Likewise, transfers paid for by private parties are less
efficient than if the government pays.
Here again the results follow from some basic principles of tax
economics. Recall that the deadweight loss of taxes rises exponentially
with the size of the tax; doubling the tax is four times as bad, roughly
speaking. All else equal, when there are more taxpayers contributing to the
cost of a given program, the tax rate for each is of course lower. Putting
these two facts together, it is well known that society is typically better off
if costs can be spread as widely as possible. 170 Privately funded carrots are
often less efficient, then, because the group who pays for the carrot will
almost certainly be smaller than the group
of all taxpayers, resulting in
171
greater total deadweight loss in most cases.
A bit less obviously, dedicating transfer funds to private beneficiaries
can be inefficient for similar reasons.172 Think of the transfer to the private
group as a special-interest income tax cut for that group. 173 The opportunity
cost of the transfer is that we could have used the same money to fund an
income tax cut for everyone. Which would have generated greater welfare?
The answer often has to be the tax cut for everyone. Why? Because the
deadweight-loss savings of the first dollar of income tax savings is the
biggest-that is, going from $100 to $99 is a bigger savings than going
from $99 to $98, and so on. Multiplying that large gain times the whole of
the taxpaying public is a much greater gain than getting only the gains

.cfm?abstract id=2331000, and Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1155, 1226-29 (2013).
168. I am still assuming for the sake of simplicity that all externality producers are private
parties so that sticks are paid and carrots collected privately.
169. E.g., Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 61.
170. See sources cited supra note 63.
171. Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 61. Some of the qualifying language in this sentence
derives from the fact that I am omitting any consideration of the marginal utility of money. But
note that, in general, diminishing marginal utility will also weigh against private transfers; even if
everyone starts with the same amount of money, the marginal cost of the last dollar paid by the
private funders will be greater than the cost of the last dollars paid by the general public, since the
general public will have more money left over after paying.
172. See Thomas D. Griffith, Should "Tax Norms" be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Policy
Analysis and the Taxation of PersonalInjury Recoveries, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1115, 1123-27.
173. Lump-sum transfers would be even less efficient. By granting the transfer in the form of
a tax cut, we can reduce the deadweight loss of taxation in addition to enriching the transferees,
while a lump-sum transfer only accomplishes the latter.
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from, say, $100 to $50 for a few people. I add a numerical example in the
74
margin below for interested readers. 1
In the analysis so far I haven't mentioned any distributive
considerations, such as the marginal utility of money for the payors and
payees, and for good reason. The trade-off in allocating transfers to or from
private parties, we have just seen, is no different than the trade-off involved
in designing the income tax itself: should some people get a tax break, at
the expense of everyone else?175 If that were a good trade-off, presumably
income tax designers would already have made it, or could do so soon,
unless for some reason it is administratively easier to effect redistribution
76
through the policy instrument, rather than the tax system.1
We're now in a good position to revisit the relative size of R and L
from the previous section. Remember that R is the social welfare gained
from cutting income taxes by the amount of the revenues earned by a
transfer instrument, while L is the amount of welfare lost to distortions in
labor supply from that instrument. A transferless instrument that creates
neither, or only a negligible L, is a better choice when L > R for the transfer
instrument alternative. When would that happen? Usually L and R are both
derived from changes in labor supply, so that R is just the bonus we get by
reducing our labor-distorting income tax. Since both L and R involve
transfer of the same amount of money-L is the loss from a tax hike of $X,
while R is the gain from a tax cut of $X-if both are distributed evenly
across the whole population there is no net change.
More likely, the population subject to L is private-it's the small
group of externality producers. Externality producers are going from
paying, say, 100 to 110, while the public is getting a cut from 100 to 99.
Because, again, distortions rise exponentially with the tax rate, the welfare
losses, L, involved in the producers' jump are larger per dollar of revenue
than the benefits, R, the public gets. As environmental economists have
recognized, it is therefore not very likely that we can come out ahead by

174. Suppose Priya Vat faces a tax of $ 00x. Assume for simplicity the deadweight loss of
the tax is the square of the tax, so Priya's tax comes with a total deadweight loss of $10,000x.
Should we reduce Priya's tax to zero or give 100 other people, each also currently paying $1 Ox, a
Six cut? Priya's break saves us $10,O00x. Each Six cut we give to someone else saves us
(S10,000x - $9,801x = $199x). Obviously, 100 x $199x = $19,900x, much more than we would
save from Priya's cut. Note, though, that if it turns out that Priya is paying a much higher tax rate
than other members of the public, such that the deadweight loss of taxing her is considerably
greater, we could have a closer question.
175. Cf KAPLOW, supra note 58, at 152-56 (explaining that all transfers can be considered in
an "aggregate" framework as aspects of the income tax system).
176. Cf Gerrit De Geest, Removing Rents: Why the Legal System Is Superior to the Income
Tax at Reducing Income Inequality 8, 35 (George Washington Univ. Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 13-10-02, 2013), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractid=2337720 (arguing that tax systems may have higher administrative and information
costs than regulation).
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taxing the small group to pay for cuts for everyone else. 177 So usually
L > R. This answers the question we left open at the end of section
III(B)(1): transferless instruments with little labor distortion do frequently
offer an advantage over transfers.
I do not mean to suggest that the reshuffling of revenues is the only
important aspect of the public/private question. Again, the distribution of
benefits and burdens can affect incentives, not to mention the political
economy of the instrument. For instance, one might defend the tax
exemption for tort judgments on the grounds that the extra social costs of
making the revenues wholly private are necessary to buy added
enforcement and monitoring effort from private parties. 78 I will largely
reserve those questions for elsewhere, however.
3. Transfer Carrots.-Finally, commentators have not previously
acknowledged that transferless instruments have a deadweight loss
advantage over carrots. If carrots are the only transfer instrument available,
transferless alternatives may be preferable even if they do not provide as
precise information. Surprisingly, carrots often can be a better bargain than
sticks or transferless instruments on a per-unit basis, but their poor targeting
ultimately makes them pricier.
Carrots look like a bargain because they don't reduce the labor supply
of externality producers. 179 In the externality case, we can give the utility of
offering a carrot as:
U,= E-C-R,

177. Bovenberg & Goulder, supra note 74, at 1498-503. That is less true if revenue gains can
be made in a tax more distortive than the income tax, such as the corporate tax. Id. at 1505-07.
Similarly here, if the government can pay for its carrots using a tax less distortive than the income
tax, the carrot transfer is more appealing.
178. Cf Dan Markel, Overcoming Tradeoffs in the Taxation of Punitive Damages, 88 WASH.
U. L. REV. 609, 636-38 (2011) (suggesting that a plaintiffs claim on punitive damages can be
thought of as a "finder's fee").
179. The subsidy creates no labor effect among marginal agents because by assumption the
amount of the subsidy is just enough to leave them indifferent. See De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci,
supra note 72, at 363 (distinguishing carrots from sticks by noting that carrots "fully compensate"
producers). If the subsidy is less than this amount, it is never collected. If it is more than this
amount, then it would increase real returns to labor, but it also would be pure waste from the
perspective of the government-in our equation, a more positive L term would be offset by a
diminished E and greater C terms. Of course, it is still possible that the pure exchange of higher
taxes on some in return for increased labor for others could be welfare-enhancing; that is arguably
the case for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Cf Gregory Acs & Eric Toder, Should We
Subsidize Work? Welfare Reform, the Earned Income Tax Creditand Optimal Transfers, 14 INT'L
TAX & PUB. FN. 327, 332 (2006) (observing that EITC offsets the negative work incentives of the
payroll tax). But that would take us away from the Pigouvian tax setting that is my focus here.
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where E and C are the same as before and R, is the deadweight loss
associated with increasing income or other taxes to pay for the carrot.1 80 By
comparison, we still have:
U,=E-L- C+R and Ur= E-L-C.
These equations imply that for any given unit of externality reduction,
a carrot is welfare superior to transferless instruments when L > R, and
superior to sticks when L > R + R,. That is, the carrot is a better deal when
the cost of paying for the carrot is less than the welfare loss that would be
caused by the other instruments' effects on labor supply.
In all likelihood, however, the per-unit cost of the carrot must be paid
many more times than the per-unit cost of a stick or transferless instrument.
As Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest argue, all carrot beneficiaries will typically
claim their carrot, regardless of whether the carrot changes the claimant's
behavior. 18 1 The cost of the other instruments is only incurred, though, for
those who would not otherwise have complied. For example, if the
government paid people not to steal, it would have to pay almost the entire
population, while if it nudged them away from theft, only the lightest
fingered of the population would feel much burden. I will add that this
large potential difference in total "price" also affects the size of the R, term:
when there are more carrot claimants, the tax rate needed to pay for them
also rises, with exponential effects on the resulting welfare loss.
C.

Carrot,Stick, or Compromise?
By definition, a transfer instrument must be either a carrot or a stick:
value is either transferred to the externality producer or away from it. In
my prior work on carrots and sticks, I argued that in many cases choosing
either instrument involves trade-offs.182 For instance, using carrots to
encourage positive externalities may offer desirable income effects but
threaten serious incentive problems. Transferless instruments offer a third
way. Since they don't move money around, they lack both the benefits and
detriments of carrots and sticks. Sometimes, that middle ground might be
the best of all. Let's look at three different kinds of trade-off: income
effects, redistribution, and incentives.
1. Income Effects.-It seems obvious that where sticks reduce the
wealth of payors and carrots increase it, transferless instruments sometimes
do neither. Though it is an obvious point, it is also potentially a very

180. Note that I assume that the subsidy creates a loss, C, from distortion in the product
market because, like the penalty, it changes consumers' preferences.
181. Dari-Mattiacci & De Geest, supra note 27, at 369-76.
182. Galle, supra note 27, at 809-13.
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significant one, and one that no other commentators seem to have focused
on. Income effects often present some of the strongest arguments for
choosing between carrots and sticks. 83 As we will see, the availability of a
third option with intermediate income effects will often open new and
potentially more efficient policy possibilities.
Of course, some transferless regulations do change wealth. Zoning
changes or other land-use regulations could make my existing property
more valuable or less. As Calabresi and Melamed noted, in the presence of
transaction costs the simple act of assigning a legal entitlement, such
as the
1 84
right to exclude, to one party might subjectively enrich that party.
Many other regulations affect welfare, but not wealth. That is an
important distinction, since the income effect operates primarily from
changes in a person's budget; as our capacity to engage in trade expands,
we may want different things.' 85 When I lose a $20 bill, I can buy less, but
stubbing my toe and suffering $20 worth of throbbing pain has no impact
on the groceries I can take home. Shaming, imprisonment, and the mental
hassle of opting out of a sticky default all could fall into this category.
Internalities present a more complex picture. Government policy that
helps individuals overcome their own mistakes may help individuals to
better allocate their spending. The consumer now can buy more of her
highest-priority goods instead of wasting money on tempting alternatives.
In effect, her budget has expanded. Or, alternately, we can think of the
internality correction as having provided the consumer with a free service,
such as credit counseling or a "commitment device," that is, a reliable way
of helping people commit to not spending foolishly. 86 Evidence suggests
are willing to pay considerable amounts for
that many households
87
commitment devices.
In the case of normal goods, this income effect can somewhat offset
the substitution effect on the consumer's consumption of the internality
good. For example, once Lindsay is no longer spending as much money
each month on her morning vodka, she can more easily pay rent. 88 With
her housing stable, it is rational for her to consume more of the less
important items in her budget, including the occasional glass of wine with
dinner.

183. Id. at 832-38.
184. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 44, at 1098-99.

185. See GRUBER, supra note 32, at 35-37.
186. Cf Markus Haavio & Kaisa Kotakorpi, The PoliticalEconomy of Sin Taxes, 55 EUR.
ECON. REV. 575, 580 (2011) ("[S]ophisticated consumers might value sin taxes as a way of
committing to a lower level of consumption in the future.").
187. Ashraf et al., supra note 164; David Laibson, Life-Cycle Consumption and Hyperbolic
DiscountFunctions, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 861, 868 (1998).
188. Cf Chetty et al., supra note 146, at 1173-74 (discussing the income effect of improved

allocation of consumer choices).
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Although the nudge does, therefore, have some potential income
effects, that effect is still an intermediate position between sticks and
carrots. An internality-correcting carrot would have an even larger income
effect: it would both expand the household's budget and also improve its
allocation. And internality-correcting sticks would have both positive and
negative income effects (better allocation, less money), such that it is
unclear which dominates in any particular instance. But since the positive
income effect of correcting the internality (improved allocation) seems
identical no matter the instrument, the stick's propensity to increase demand
would be unambiguously less than that of the nudge.
For pure internalities, though, the income effect of a government
correction may not matter much. By assumption, society's only interest is
in helping the household get to its unbiased preferred consumption of each
good. The household's demand for the internality does not drop as far as it
would in the absence of income effects. But the new level of consumption
is still the efficient level for the household, given its new wealth and
preferences.
The income effects of correcting an internality are most clearly
189
problematic in the case of goods with both internalities and externalities.
Imagine that the Shvitz household has an old, inefficient air conditioning
unit. They receive a government subsidy to buy a new one. Though they
will spend less on energy consumption keeping cool, they also will be able
to afford to run their air conditioner more often. If they had instead been
threatened with a fine and self-financed the purchase of a new air
conditioner, they would have had less money to run the new unit. Also note
in the energy case that households with higher wealth can consume other
goods that produce externalities. Even though the Shvitzes are subjectively
better off with their new unit, they also now have more money to drive
around or heat their house in winter.
2. Distributive Effects.-Next, carrots and sticks differ considerably in
the way they redistribute wealth, and that difference is important for many
commentators. 190 Carrots move money from taxpayers or private payors to
externality producers, while sticks do the opposite. 19'
Transferless
instruments, in contrast, can be distributively neutral. 92 That seemingly
banal distinction has some potentially important policy consequences.

189. Cf Allcott et al., supra note 12, at 11-24 (modeling effects of subsidies for energyefficient durable goods on marginal energy consumption).
190. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 44, at 1121 (using the example of a factory
polluting a wealthy section of town to show how different solutions, among them carrots and
sticks, produce markedly different trade-offs between economic efficiency and distributional
goals).
191. Id.
192. Id.
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For one, I have argued before that the distributive consequences of
sticks may be a reason to prefer carrots when programs affect poorer
households. 193 Transferring funds away from taxpayers who are already
indigent runs contrary to basic distributive justice principles. Indeed, the
logic of redistribution seems to have driven the design of both the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the cap-and-trade climate change bill
passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in 2009. Both legislative
schemes relied primarily on a traditional stick to control externalities. The
ACA, famously, imposes a penalty tax on households that fail to purchase
insurance, while the cap-and-trade bill required businesses to purchase
licenses to emit greenhouse gases. 194 Each, though, made exceptions for
low-income families. The ACA exempts households that cannot find
"affordable" insurance from its mandate, providing them with subsidies
instead. 95 The climate-change legislation offered lump-sum refunds to
each household, which in effect converted it into a transferless price. 196
Carrots and transferless instruments have another practical advantage
over sticks. It is well known that imposing liability on households that
might be unable to afford to pay the full stick price would blunt the
incentive effects of the price instrument. 197 If insurance is unavailable, the
implication is that a different regulatory option-imprisonment, for
example-may be necessary to ensure that poorer households face the
correct marginal incentives.' 98 Though other commentators have not
mentioned it, this same argument can be a reason to substitute carrots for
sticks.
If both carrots and transferless prices can account for low-income or
judgment-proof producers, which one is the better choice? The ACA or the
climate-change bill? There are good arguments for each, depending on
context. As we have already seen, when income taxes are a perfectly viable
redistributive tool, transferless instruments may be superior because they
reduce the social cost of paying for carrots.
On the other hand, carrots may be a strong choice when policy makers
cannot easily use the income tax for redistribution. Obviously, a carrot
transfer will move more money to poor households than a transferless
193. Galle, supra note 27, at 817-20.
194. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(3) (Supp. V 2012); American Clean Energy and Security Act of
2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 311 (2009).
195. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1).
196. H.R. 2454 § 431.
197. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 44, at 739-40; see also Helfand et al., supra note 23,
at 297 (noting that judgment-proof firms are also difficult to adequately deter); Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Theory of the CriminalLaw, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1193, 1208 (1985) (suggesting that
nonmonetary penalties for crimes can be justified where a defendant has resources to pay a fine
but those resources are illiquid).
198. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 44, at 740. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 22, at
411-12, 420-22, for development of this idea in the criminal-enforcement context.
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instrument would. As we saw in the last section, redistributive carrots are
often indistinguishable from using the income tax for the same purpose: we
are raising some people's taxes to cut others'. Kaplow argues it therefore
would be foolish to adopt an externality-correcting policy in order to effect
some redistribution. 199 Since the policy offers only what is already
available through existing institutions, we should not pay to set up a new
regulatory structure unless it is worthwhile on nonredistributive grounds.
But this assumes a fully operational income tax. Even putting aside
political economy concerns, redistributive income taxation can be
impractical for some governments, or at least less efficient than a privately
funded carrot alternative. Municipal governments offer a classic example.
If a city imposes an income tax, it drives taxpayers into surrounding
suburbs, where they can still enjoy most of its amenities.0 0 User fees on
the amenities make that kind of free riding more difficult.20 1 These fees can
then be used to subsidize amenity consumption by poorer users. For
example, revenues from tolls or congestion fees can be set aside to pay for
public transportation or other transit assistance for the indigent. For central
cities, transfer policies may be the only practical way of achieving their
preferred level of redistribution.2 °2
3. Games and Mitigation.-A third set of major differences between
transferless and rival instruments is their respective effect on incentives for
future behavior. Nudges and other surprising instruments also have some
additional features that distinguish them from ordinary transferless policies.
First, transferless instruments split the difference between carrots and
stick transfers when it comes to the incentives of victims. Recall that
efficient laws generally give victims the incentive to mitigate their own
exposure to harm when they are the least cost avoider.20 3 Victims who can
collect damages for their full harm, despite failure to take precautions, may
lack incentive to avoid injury. Therefore most commentators suggest that
2 °4
fines or punitive damages should be paid to the state rather than victims.
In my terminology, these proposals convert the private transfer into a public
one.

199. KAPLOW, supra note 58, at 32.
200. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part ll-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLuM. L.
REv. 346, 351-53 (1990).
201. WILLIAM G. COLMAN, A QUiET REVOLUTION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 9-10

(1983).
202. Federalism theorists also suggest other alternatives, such as
have their own problems. Richard M. Bird & Michael Smart,
Transfers: InternationalLessonsfor Developing Countries,30 WORLD
203. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 172 (7th
204. See sources cited supra note 65.

revenue sharing, but these
Intergovernmental Fiscal
DEV. 899, 900-09 (2002).
ed. 2007).
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I have argued before that even fully public transfers can fail to achieve
the goals commentators set for them.2 °5 If victims are also taxpayers, they
share partially in the benefits of the public transfer. Often that share is tiny
enough to be irrelevant, but that is certainly less true of, say, a large firm in
a small town. Reciprocally, carrots might be preferable to sticks, even if the
carrots' costs are fully public, because potential victims or beneficiaries
must bear a fraction of the treasury cost. The public therefore retains an
incentive, if only partial, to reduce the cost of bribing externality producers.
And of course this incentive would be stronger if the costs were borne by a
small, private group.
By escaping revenue effects altogether, transferless prices fall in
between these two cases. They avoid giving any reward, even a fractional
one, to victims. If victim mitigation is an important concern, transferless
instruments, such as prison, might be more efficient than transfer sticks,
such as fines, contradicting what has been thought until now a fundamental
tenet of the economics of crime.20 6 Admittedly, though, transferless
instruments also may fail to offer even the fractional incentive a carrot
could provide. 0 7
Secondly, surprising instruments add another wrinkle to the incentives
game. Carrots and sticks differ crucially in their effects on forward-looking
actors. According to Coase and many others, carrots' fatal flaw lies in their
tendency to encourage new harms by producers who want to be paid to
stop. 20 8 Similarly, in the case of positive externalities, carrots can crowd

out good behavior or encourage strategic delays, as the producer dawdles
until the government agrees to pay. 0 9 In contrast, a producer who
anticipates that her activity will be punished has good reasons to take steps
to mitigate her harm in advance. 10
Transferless instruments can duplicate these ex ante effects, but only to
the extent that externality producers recognize in advance that they will
perceive the instrument as costly or rewarding. Will knowing that I might
have to get up to drink a bigger serving of soda next year make me want to
cut back on Coke today? Probably not to the extent a future soda tax

205. Galle, supra note 27, at 824-27.
206. Crime theorists have made this argument at least since Bentham. Becker, supra note 22,
at 193 n.40.
207. Some transferless instruments, such as imprisonment, can also be costly to construct and
administer. But the carrot is typically more efficient because if set optimally its total cost is equal
to the total harm, while the cost of the prison system is essentially random, and therefore could
greatly over- or under-incentivize mitigation.
208. Wiener, supra note 27, at 726 & n.186.
209. See Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 499, 546-47
(2000) (examining the incentive effects of subsidies for public-interest broadcasting).
210. Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations,and Reparations,99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657, 1663
(1999).
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would.21' Objectively, going back for a second serving seems like a trivial
cost; it's only in the moment that we face it that it seems unduly
burdensome.21 2
Nudges can therefore offer a third alternative to sticks and carrots,
which may be useful in some policy scenarios. For example, I've argued
that, despite the deep political obstacles to a successful global stick to
prevent climate change, policy makers should avoid carrots due to their
negative incentive effects.2t 3 Climate nudges, such as those Sunstein
proposes in a forthcoming book chapter, 214 could be a third possibility,
allowing for some incremental progress without triggering the kinds of
gamesmanship carrots would. On the other hand, the people for whom
nudges are most effective are exactly those who are the least forwardlooking-they aren't the kind of people who weigh the future heavily in
their present decisions. So anticipation effects of all kinds are smaller for
that population, reducing
the difference between nudges and more
21 5
instruments.
traditional
4. Framing.-Finally,as I mentioned briefly in The Tragedy of the
Carrots, and as Eyal Zamir discusses at length in his recent work, sticks
may be more effective than carrots because of the way that humans perceive
redistribution. 216 Some evidence suggests that we tend to respond more
strongly to events we perceive as losses than we do to events framed as
gains.217 I posited that, because these framing effects are often manipulable
and may be temporary, they likely should not be a central component of

211. Cf Jonathan Gruber, Tobacco at the Crossroads: The Past and Future of Smoking
Regulation in the United States, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2001, at 193, 202-03 (summarizing
studies finding that expectation of future price changes affects current consumption of willpower
goods).
212. Camerer et al., supra note 17, at 1219, 1222.
213. Galle, supra note 27, at 845-46.
214. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Economics, Consumption, and Environmental Protection,
in HANDBOOK ON RESEARCH IN SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION (Lucia Reisch & John Thogerson
eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 2-3), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract id=2296015.
215. Cf George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, "We Can Do This the Easy Way or the
Hard Way": Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 183, 189
(2006) (noting that ex post incentives are ineffective for individuals with unusually high time
discounting).
216. Galle, supra note 27, at 816; Eyal Zamir, Loss Aversion and the Law, 65 VAND. L. REV.
829, 843-85 (2012).
217. Zamir, supra note 216, at 834-43. For skepticism about some but not all of this
evidence, see Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept
Gap, the "Endowment Effect, " Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for
Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. EcoN. REV. 530, 537-38 (2005) and Gregory Klass & Kathryn
Zeiler, Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics and Legal Scholarship 27-42
(Georgetown, Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 13-013, 2013),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2224105.
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price-instrument policy.218
Zamir, though acknowledging
the
manipulability of framing, suggests that loss aversion is nonetheless
pervasive enough to be the source of important moral intuitions, such as tort
law's differential
treatment of negligent injury and negligent failure to
2 19
rescue.
Whether Zamir is closer to right than I am or not, transferless
instruments could potentially represent a middle path of loss aversion. As
far as I am aware, there is no clear evidence on whether individuals

perceive the cost of overcoming defaults or other nonmonetary
inconveniences as "losses." But given that we know some actors do not
even notice that defaults have changed their behavior, it would be
surprising if on average individuals viewed defaults as being as costly as
explicit prices of similar magnitude. Nudges therefore offer policy makers

a third option in the loss aversion continuum. Loss aversion presents policy
makers with a trade-off. With lower loss aversion, they may get less
deterrence per dollar of penalty. 22°

But they also get less bitter political

opposition from incumbent producers. Therefore, nudges might22not
be as
1
effective as sticks, but they might be more politically achievable.
D.

Targeting

A final important area where price instruments may diverge is their
ability to be targeted or "tagged" most precisely. As others have shown,

asymmetric policies can help to resolve serious targeting problems in the
regulation of intemalities.222 Prior commentary has not explored whether
this same argument still applies for the regulation of externalities; the basic
logic of the targeting argument seems implausible in that context. I will

218. Galle, supra note 27, at 808-09; see also Yuval Feldman, The Complexity of
Disentangling Intrinsic and Extrinsic Compliance Motivations: Theoretical and Empirical
Insightsfrom the BehavioralAnalysis ofLaw, 35 WASH. U.J.L. &POL'Y 11, 38-39(2011).
219. Zamir, supra note 216, at 884, 887-90. For recent evidence that the framing of policies
as tax or subsidy matters, see Homonoff, supra note 98, at 3-4.
220. For discussion of whether it would ever be optimal for producers to perceive prices as
being in excess of their true cost, see Galle, supra note 121 (manuscript at 31-33) (short answer:
probably not).
221. Another way in which nudges might be more politically viable is if internality sufferers
are aware of their own problems but underestimate them. Then demand for an internalitycorrecting stick will be low. See Strnad, supra note 30, at 1256-57. But these same households
would also presumably underestimate the cost of a future nudge, which could allow for a much
costlier nudge than would be possible if the commitment device were structured as a monetary
penalty. Cf Katrina Fischer Kuh, When Government Intrudes: Regulating IndividualBehaviors
that Harm the Environment, 61 DuKE L.J. 1111, 1175-76 (2012) (noting that individuals may not
oppose regulations that impose costs on them only indirectly); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order
Without Social Norms: How PersonalNorm Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1101, 1103-04 (2005) (arguing that changing conservation norms through information
and other informal regulatory devices is more politically viable than price-based mandates).
222. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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argue that asymmetric approaches can have targeting advantages for
positive externalities, mixed internality/externality cases, and instances in
which human error weakens the power of conventional instruments.
1. Targeting Externalities.-The power of targeting lies in its ability
to reduce unnecessary welfare costs of regulation. When individuals vary
in their propensity for errors and willpower lapses, a uniform price or
regulation may inefficiently distort incentives or otherwise produce
deadweight loss. 223 For example, taxes on cigarettes might help some
smokers who want to quit to steady their resolve. But other smokers might
be "rational addict[s]," in Gary Becker's famous turn of phrase: they are
well-informed, respond fully to the long-term costs they face, and accept
them.224 For them, the tax simply imposes
pain or misshapes their
225
preferences, a classic case of deadweight loss.
Nudge proponents claim that asymmetric regulation accounts for
heterogeneity by allowing costs to vary together with the need for
correction.22 6 That is, those who treat the costs of a nudge as larger also
may tend to be those who suffer from internalities. The irrational smoker
perhaps smokes because he focuses excessively on his present satisfaction.
That same trait will make the burden of, say, putting on his coat and
stepping outside to smoke much more irksome than it would be for others
who weren't similarly present biased. So an indoor-smoking-ban nudge
corrects the internality for those who suffer it while imposing rather small
costs on those who don't.
It seems much harder to tell this story about externalities.227 Nudges'
targeting works best where susceptibility to the nudge is correlated with the
harm to be prevented.228 Toxic waste, though, is equally harmful no matter
who emits it.
Nudges may, however, help overcome the problems caused by
inframarginal producers of positive externalities, which can be thought of as
an aspect of targeting. 229 Inframarginality can make carrots an especially

223. Stmad, supra note 30, at 1252, 1254-55.
224. Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of RationalAddiction, 96 J. POL. ECON.

675, 676-78 (1988).
225. See De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 72, at 362-65 (pointing out that sticks may
burden actors with higher than average costs of compliance). If the tax is very small, though, the
behavioral effect on rational consumers should be negligible, in which case internality gains
should exceed any deadweight loss. O'Donoghue & Rabin, supranote 151, at 1835.
226. See Allcott et al., supra note 12, at 2, 23.
227. This difficulty has not dissuaded nudge proponents. See sources cited supra note 88.
228. Camerer et al., supra note 17, at 1219, 1222.
229. See Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable
Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 45-46 (2006) (arguing that targeting is important for positive
externalities because of the social cost of paying for subsidies). The marginal actor is the person
who is just on the knife-edge of deciding what to do; with a bit of stick or carrot, they will change
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wasteful policy choice. Carrots are generally awarded to everyone who
goes along with the regulator's goals, so that there is no easy way to sort
out those who would have done so anyway from those who needed some
extra incentive. 230 Every itemizer who donates to charity gets a charitable
contribution deduction, even if they would have given out of religious
obligation or personal generosity. 231 That's most problematic for positive
externalities because our intuition is that voluntary reductions in negative
externalities are relatively rare. Any transferless instrument, including a
nudge, can help on this front by reducing the social cost of transfers to
inframarginal producers.
Both carrot and stick transfers can also actually reduce positive
contributions from inframarginal producers by crowding out their internal
motivation.2 32 Researchers find that offering explicit monetary rewards can
diminish voluntary contributions.2 33 The psychological mechanism is
uncertain.*233 Some psychologists suggest that monetary incentives are
particularly apt to generate resistance because they reduce our sense of
autonomy.235 Possibly the dollar award attracts excessive focus, distracting
volunteers from the more abstract reasons they held previously. 236 Being
paid may also diminish the "warm glow" signal that donors usually
experience: some individuals may behave altruistically because they want
to be recognized by others as altruistic, and when there is an explicit
monetary incentive, that signal is muddied.23 7

their behavior. "Inframarginal" agents are so committed to their path that the incentive effects of
the price instrument are not important.
230. De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 72, at 370; Galle, supra note 27, at 820-21, 83334. Under an effective enforcement regime, sticks will fall only on actors who defy the
government's objectives, and so this form of inframarginality problem doesn't arise.
231. See I.R.C. § 170 (2006). I omit mention of some technical limits that don't affect my
point.
232. Wendy J. Gordon, OfHarms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property,
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 457 (1992); Andrew Green, You Can't Pay Them Enough: Subsidies,
EnvironmentalLaw, and Social Norms, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 432-35 (2006).
233. For a helpful overview, see Feldman, supra note 218, at 23-29.
234. Id. at 24.
235. Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The Empirical Exploration of Intrinsic
Motivational Processes, in 13 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 39, 61
(Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1980).
236. See Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Environmental Morale and Motivation, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR 406,412-13 (Alan Lewis
in focus from internal
ed., 2008) (suggesting that crowding out may be due to an individual's shift
to external motivations).
237. See Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Human
Altruism, 422 NATURE 137, 140 (2003); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors,
Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 83, 99 (1978); cf E. Tory Higgins & Yaacov Trope, Activity Engagement Theory:
Implications of Multiply Identifiable Input for Intrinsic Motivation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
MOTIVATION AND COGNITION: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 229, 240-43 (E. Tory
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Nudges can offer a partial solution.23 8 Several studies find that nudgelike interventions have improved altruistic behavior. 23 9 Because the
nudge's incentive effect is not easily visible to others, it may not confuse
the altruistic signal to the same extent dollars do. And the implicit "price"
of the nudge is more subtle, and thereby perhaps less likely to reduce selfperceived autonomy or to assume more salience than the donor's other
motives in his mind.
2. Mixed Internality/Externality Cases.-Another plausible story for
why asymmetric regulations might be effective for externalities is if there
are also internalities happening at the same time. For example, we might
want to help the planet, but lack the willpower to dedicate ourselves on a
daily basis to such a long-term goal.24 ° Or we might fail ourselves in ways
that also impose large harms on others, such as by overconsuming
expensive energy sources or leaving ourselves vulnerable to risks that
others will ultimately have to help us overcome. 22441 In these scenarios, there
is once again potentially a strong correlation between the subjective costs of
the nudge or other surprising instrument and the need for regulation. For
instance, instant energy feedback from "smart meters" will not do much to
change the behavior of those who are already very energy conscious, but
then it will not cost them much, either.
O'Donoghue and Rabin argue that taxes, too, can achieve the targeting
benefit that they (in their joint work with Camerer and Issacharoff) attribute
to nudges, but their claim relies on a questionable assumption. They posit
that since only low willpower individuals will continue to consume
242
tempting goods subject to a tax, rational consumers will not pay the tax.
But the optimal tax may vary considerably across individuals. For instance,
soda drinkers who are more prone to diabetes may represent a greater

Higgins & Richard M. Sorrentino eds., 1990) (noting that extrinsic incentives may reduce
perception that an actor was self-motivated).
238. See Amir & Lobel, supra note 19, at 2130-32 (suggesting that behaviorally informed
regulation may be able to reduce crowding-out effects).
239. E.g., Alberto Abadie & Sebastien Gay, The Impact of Presumed Consent Legislation on
Cadaveric Organ Donation: A Cross-Country Study, 25 J. HEALTH EcON. 599, 606-13 (2006);
James Andreoni & Justin M. Rao, The Power of Asking: How Communication Affects Selfishness,
Empathy, andAltruism, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 513, 515-17 (2011).
240. Andrew Green, Self Control, Individual Choice, and Climate Change, 26 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 77, 78-79 (2008); see also Leonhard K. Lades, Impulsive Consumption and Reflexive
Thought: Nudging Ethical Consumer Behavior, J. ECON. PSYCHOL. (forthcoming) (manuscript at
9-10) (on file with author); cf Ayres, supra note 52, at 2088 (proposing use of sticky defaults to
account for heterogeneity in production of externalities); Sunstein & Thaler, Libertarian
Paternalism, supra note 17, at 1192-93 (discussing "libertarian benevolence," which appears to
be the use of nudges to encourage positive externalities).
241. See Galle & Utset, supra note 89, at 72-77 (discussing the impact of time inconsistency,
poor planning, and procrastination by certain households in energy consumption).
242. O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 151, at 1831, 1835.
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potential social cost. High taxes on drinkers with low propensity to create
externalities would simply represent deadweight loss, undermining their
targeting argument. Nudges may also be better targeted in the sense that
they may be better capable of changing the behavior of individuals who are
usually inattentive to costs and benefits and so would not be much
influenced by a tax. 243 But this is not to say that advances in tax design
could not potentially match nudges' targeting potential in the future. 244
3. Better than Errors.-Lastly, asymmetric regulation might be an
effective supplement or alternative when human errors render less
surprising instruments ineffective. Take the case of individual retirement
arrangements, or IRAs, an important tax incentive for retirement savings. 4 5
now, the public
One justification for IRAs is that, if households do not save
246
infirm.
and
old
are
they
when
them
for
care
to
have
will
Despite their enormous annual cost-more than $125 billion
annually247-IRAs and related retirement provisions don't seem to work,
and it is easy to see why. Imagine that the government will pay you to
overcome your tendency to procrastinate planning for retirement, but in
order to collect your reward you have to read some program rules written in
bureaucrat, find household records that establish your eligibility, go through
some complex calculations, and fill out and submit government forms.
Quite probably, serious procrastinators are the very last people who would
benefit from that program. 24824 But that is exactly the structure of IRAs.249
Unsurprisingly, then, Chetty et al. find massive mistargeting of similar
retirement incentives in Denmark, with about 85% of the beneficiaries, by
their estimation, receiving subsidies that do not meaningfully change
behavior.25 °
Asymmetric regulation is useful for these situations because it helps to
patch gaps created by variations in the public's responsiveness to traditional
regulation. Though some people are too inattentive or impatient for

243. Cf id. at 1835 (acknowledging that internality-correcting taxes are inefficient unless
"people with self-control problems are sensitive to tax changes").
244. O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 164, at 109, offer some examples.
245. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., JCX-53-08, PRESENT LAW AND
ANALYSIS RELATING TO INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ARRANGEMENTS 16 (2008), available at

https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1286.
246. POSNER, supra note 203, at 498-99.
247. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TAX EXPENDITURES
IN THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM 6 tbl. 1 (2013).

248. This is not a problem entirely exclusive to carrots. For example, sticks that are imposed
long after the unwanted behavior are poorly targeted because of excessive time discounting.
Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 215.
249. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 245, at 16-46 (discussing the
present law surrounding IRAs).
250. Chetty et al., supra note 14 (manuscript at 43-44).
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monetary incentives to be fully effective, others may be more sensitive.
Even in the Chetty et al. study, 15% of Danes did respond quite readily to
retirement incentives. 251
Government could increase the size of its
incentives to try to grab people's attention, but then we also are showering
extra funds-or extra penalties--on those who were already paying
attention, leading to complicated trade-offs. 2 So again we have a targeting
problem, with potentially a strong correlation between some kinds of
mental errors and the need for additional government regulation.
Asymmetric regulation targeted to affect those who are especially
insensitive to prices would therefore seem a good policy alternative.
I should acknowledge, though, that traditional prices may have an
advantage over nudges when the optimal tax schedule is complex. Recall
that-setting aside some possible complications-the optimal Pigouvian
price should be set equal to marginal social damage.
For some
externalities, that damage could vary considerably depending on, say, the
consumer's prior health history, his family situation, where he lives, and so
on. 253 Alcohol consumption is a likely example, especially since small
amounts of alcohol may actually improve some health outcomes. 4 With
enough information, an ex ante tax can approximate these effects, and with
a reliable enough system of proof, an expost liability system can as well.255
It isn't clear whether nudges can. If susceptibility to the nudge
happens to be closely correlated with propensity to produce externalities,
the impact of the nudge could vary with the marginal damage, but this may
not always be possible.
But most commentators believe that the
informational demands of such a flexible tax are also usually unrealistic, 6
so this may not be a significant weakness of nudges.
IV. Examples
We now have the tools to evaluate New York City's beverage-size
limits, and a number of other innovative policy proposals, too. The results
are a bit surprising. The superiority of taxes or other stick transfers, which
prior commentators have almost universally assumed, in some instances is
not so clear. Maybe less surprisingly, carrots often look even worse than
they did when nudges were not in the picture, as nudges in many cases can
substitute for carrots without presenting the same risks.
251. Id. at 36.
252. For extended analysis of these trade-offs, see Galle, supra note 121 (manuscript at 13-

35).
253. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 46, at 4-5 (indicating marginal social harm can be

nonlinear or unfixed).
254. Stmad, supra note 30, at 1244.
255. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Cost of Cigarettes: The Economic Casefor Ex
Post Incentive-BasedRegulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1268-74 (1998).
256. O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 151, at 1830; Stmad, supra note 30, at 1271-72.
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A.

Soda
Let's begin our examples with the recent controversy over New York's
sugary-beverage policy. The City Health Department justified its proposal
primarily with an externality story: soda contributes significantly to obesity,
which in turn imposes serious cost burdens on publicly funded health
25
services. 25
The policy may also help to protect consumers against
themselves, but for my purposes here not much changes if we also include
this "internality" story.258 Either way, the factors I have identified
somewhat favor nudge-type approaches, such as the city's cap, over a soda
tax or similar stick-like instrument, such as cutting subsidies to beverage
ingredients or increasing tort liability for beverage producers.259
Size limits are better targeted at soda drinkers' potential internalities
than a tax would be. The default size is most binding on individuals with
high discount rates and excessive focus on the present. 6 ° Caffeine quaffers
who excessively discount the future will more likely view the bother of
obtaining a second cup as disproportionately large relative to the later
benefits of quenching their thirst.26' Similarly, those who are the most
focused on their immediate surroundings would be the most likely to be
influenced by the size of the portion in front of them.262 These two groups
are also those who predictably will not accurately account for the future
cost of their consumption when they make present drinking decisions.
257. Thomas A. Farley, NYC Health Commissioner: Limiting Soda Is the Right Way to
Protect the Health of New Yorkers, FORBES (June 11, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/robwaters/2013/06/1 1/nyc-health-commissioner-limiting-soda-size-is-the-right-way-toprotect-the-health-of-new-yorkers/; see also Korobkin, supra note 84, at 1681-82. For evidence
that soda consumption contributes to obesity, and therefore to obesity-related health problems, see
generally Cara B. Ebbeling et al., A Randomized Trial of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and
Adolescent Body Weight, 367 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1407 (2012); and Janene C. de Ruyter et al., A
Trial of Sugar-Freeor Sugar-SweetenedBeverages and Body Weight in Children, 367 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1397 (2012).
258. Jeff Stmad, in his exhaustive 2005 analysis, argued that "fat taxes" in general were best
defended as a form of implicit insurance premium charged to consumers who would later put
demands on the health-care system rather than as internality-correcting. Strnad, supra note 30, at
1234, 1267-68. But Stmad did not argue there were no intemalities, only that taxes could not be
targeted accurately enough at internality sufferers. Id. at 1322. Nudges may improve targeting
enough to overcome Strnad's objections.
259. For discussion of the role of government subsidies in excess beverage consumption, see
Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645,
1791-95 (2004).
260. See James J. Choi et al., Optimal Defaults, 93 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROCS.) 180,
180-81 (2003) (modeling properties of defaults generally).
261. For evidence that obesity may be the product of impatience, see sources cited supra note
115.
262. See Chandon, supra note 10, at 16 (connecting overeating to temptation and
misperceptions of the true size of food portions); Andrew B. Geier et al., Unit Bias: A New
Heuristic That Helps Explain the Effect of Portion Size on Food Intake, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 521,
524 (2006) (suggesting that "immediate presence" of temptation helps to explain the influence of
portion size on consumption).
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In contrast, a soda tax would likely fall on all consumers, including
those who are not at any risk of obesity and those who have rationally
concluded that the risks are worth the costs. At least for those at low risk,
the tax simply imposes pain or distorts behavior without any offsetting gain.
On the other hand, this argument presumes that any soda tax would
necessarily have to be linear-that is, that we would impose the same price
per serving for all consumers. If a more flexible schedule were possible,
such that those who are at greater risk of health consequences paid higher
prices, then the tax might be better targeted than the nudge. It is very
unlikely the ideal portion size is identical for all consumers. 263 But
realistically it also seems very improbable that either the tax or the portion
size could be set to vary with real marginal costs.
The size limit may also be better targeted in the sense that it reduces
the extent to which internality sufferers substitute into other unhealthy
behaviors. For example, taxes on soda could encourage consumers to
switch to other unhealthy choices. 2 4 Will soda drinkers similarly switch to
sugary juices in order to be able to buy them in larger sizes? Though of
course time will tell, the soda nudge might not produce much of this kind of
switching. To induce switching, the would-be consumer must recognize in
advance that she will want additional consumption and also recognize that
she will then be unwilling to pay the price to overcome the default. As we
have seen, both of these are uncertain: the consumption decision may be the
product of the portion size the consumer experiences, and her ability to
predict her perception of the price may be limited.
On the other hand, the soda tax certainly brings in more dollars than
the size limit, but the welfare effects of that swap are less clear. As I argued
earlier, it is possible that consumers would perceive an explicit tax to
reduce their returns to labor, while not noticing or even appreciating the
effects of a similar nudge. The beverage size limit seems a good example
of where it is plausible that consumers would not connect the nudge to their
labor/leisure decision, since again there will be consumers who do not even
notice that the smaller portion size changed their preferences. If so, then
the greater revenues of the soda tax also come at some additional social
cost, and it is ambiguous whether the opportunity they offer to cut other
taxes (or invest in worthwhile new government programs) makes society
better off on net.
The nudge option does seem to have better distributive outcomes.
Studies find that the population at greatest risk from excessive sugary
263. Stmad, supra note 30, at 1321.
264. Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Impact of Targeted Beverage Taxes on Higher- and LowerIncome Households, 170 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2028, 2033 (2010) (raising the substitution
question); Jason M. Fletcher et al., The Effects of Soft Drink Taxes on Child and Adolescent
Consumption and Weight Outcomes, 94 J. PuB. ECON. 967, 972-73 (2010) (reporting evidence
that taxes cause substitution to other unhealthy beverages).
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beverage consumption tends to be rather poorer on average than others. 265
So the soda tax has a good chance to be even more regressive than a
standard sales tax. Some commentators have suggested mitigating that
unfortunate outcome either through paying back the tax's proceeds to lowincome households through cash rebates or by offering subsidies for healthy
food options.266 But note that some of these alternatives are either identical
to or (if subsidies exceed taxes collected) inferior on revenue terms to the
nudge. If all revenues are rebated, the nudge and tax are identical, except
that the nudge is better targeted.267
Finally, and cutting in the other direction, in the absence of a rebate
taxes could have an advantage when it comes to income effects. Both the
tax and the default could help the consumer to better allocate her available
budget, creating a positive income effect-as the household feels richer,
they demand more goods, including foods that could contribute to obesity.
The tax, however, reduces the consumer's household wealth, likely
diminishing her demand for soda.268 On the other hand, some evidence
suggests that junk food is an inferior good,269 in which case the nudge is
better: by leaving the household with more money, the nudge diminishes its
demand for the unhealthiest foods.
On net, the case for surprising alternatives to a soda tax is surprisingly
good. That is not to say that the 16-ounce cap is the best such policy. Right
now, we have no particular reason to think that 16 ounces is the optimal
serving size. But additional policy experiments can help to identify which
transferless policies are best.
B.

Retirement

It is interesting also to consider an instance where nudges could
replace carrot transfers. Retirement savings offer a major example. In their
study of Danish workers, Chetty et al. appear to endorse proposals replacing
265. Valerie Gebara & Leena Gupta, Consumption of Sugar Sweetened Beverages (SSBs) in
New York City, EPI DATA BRIEF (N.Y.C. Dep't of Health and Mental Hygiene), May 2011, at 1-2,
availableat http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/epi/databrief4.pdf.
266. Battle & Brownell, supra note 30; Pratt, supra note 30, at 124-25; see also Sugarman &
Sandman, supra note 30, at 1489 (proposing rebates to help states cover the costs of obesity
reduction).
267. The tax might produce extra revenue if only a fraction is rebated-for instance, if only
lower-income households collect a refund. But note that a means-tested rebate in effect is an
income tax. See KAPLOW, supra note 58, at 153-54. Such a rebate would thus create additional
economic distortions.
268. See Gideon Yaniv et al., Junk-Food, Home Cooking, Physical Activity and Obesity: The
Effect of the Fat Tax and the Thin Subsidy, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 823, 826-27 (2009) (arguing that
subsidies for healthy foods could increase demand for unhealthy foods through income effect).
269. Matthew Harding & Michael Lovenheim, The Effect of Product and Nutrient-Specific
Taxes on Shopping Behavior and Nutrition: Evidence from Scanner Data 16 (Mar. 4, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.stanford.edu/-mch/resources/Harding_
Nutrition.pdf.
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tax incentives for retirement contributions, such as the 401(k) plan (and its
lesser-known cousins, such as § 403(b)) with employer-administered
default contributions to workers' retirement accounts. 270 Though they do
not frame it in precisely the terms I have set out here, in essence their claim
is that defaults are better targeted and less costly for the government.271
Again, their study finds that "inattentive" investors save more when default
contributions are ratcheted up, but that those investors ignore (while still
benefiting from) tax incentives.2 72 And inattentive investors make up 85%
of the Danish working population.2 73 Thus, they claim that default
contributions both require little government investment and also reduce the
likelihood of giving money to inframarginal agents.274
My analysis supports this story, but suggests some possible
qualifications. For one, the welfare benefits of default savings may be
smaller than Chetty et al. assume. Eliminating § 401(k) could save on the
order of $125 billion annually, allowing the government to lower overall
tax rates and reduce the deadweight loss of federal taxation. 275 But the
default may also generate deadweight loss, not only because it may not
match the preferences of some "inattentive" investors but also because it
might affect their labor supply. If workers who ignore retirement are in fact
motivated only by today's take-home pay, they may perceive an extra 6%

270. See Chetty et al., supra note 14 (manuscript at 43-44) (suggesting that automatic
contributions are preferable to tax incentives). For a summary of past legislative efforts, see
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 245, at 48-49. For other academic supporters
of opt-in defaults as a solution to the retirement savings problem, see generally J. Mark Iwry &
David C. John, Pursuing Universal Retirement Security Through Automatic IRAs, in AGING
GRACEFULLY: IDEAS TO IMPROVE RETIREMENT SECURITY IN AMERICA 45 (Peter Orszag et al.

eds., 2006); William G. Gale et al., The Saver's Credit: Savings for Middle- and Lower-Income
Americans, in AGING GRACEFULLY, supra, at 77; Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch,
Social Security Reform: Lessons from Private Pensions, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 297, 308-10
(2007); Camerer et al., supra note 17, at 1227-29; Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution
Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 523-24 (2004).

271.
savings
passive
impacts

See Chetty et al., supra note 14 (concluding that one reason automatic contributions to
are more effective than price subsidies is that "policies that influence the behavior of
savers have lower fiscal costs, generate relatively little crowd-out, and have the largest
on individuals who are paying the least attention to saving for retirement").
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Cf id. at 38-39 (discussing how a government price subsidy has a small impact on
savings because the subsidy is an inframarginal transfer with a low interest elasticity of savings
for active savers). Chetty et al. also claim that tax incentives don't increase net savings even
among attentive households because in their sample, tax incentives just encourage investors to
move money from existing savings into tax-favored accounts. Id. at 43. This is an important
result, but it doesn't necessarily imply that the incentives are fruitless. Eligible, retirementsavings vehicles may be much stickier than other savings-among other reasons, because there is
a statutory penalty for withdrawal. If the government's goal is long-term savings, moving money
into these stickier accounts may, therefore, still be a somewhat good investment.
275. Or, of course, the government could spend the S 125 billion in some other way, if the
alternative generates greater welfare gains than the tax cut.
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set-aside out of current earnings as the equivalent of a 6% tax. 276 That
might be a bigger effective hike than any cut that could accompany the
$125 billion windfall.277
Chetty et al. also appear to assume that switching away from the
401(k) carrot will better align income effects, but that isn't necessarily the
case. They echo a common criticism of carrots for retirement, which is that
increases in household wealth tend to stimulate consumption, while the goal
of the policy is to encourage savings and, therefore, to reduce current
consumption. 278 As we have seen though, it is possible that a very welltargeted default could also be perceived as expanding the household's
budget. Workers could see their returns to labor as higher, since they will
not be wasting as much money on short-term temptations. So, in short, a
more complete assessment of their proposal requires us to know more about
how inattentive investors respond to default savings.279
Perhaps a central theme to both the soda and retirement examples is
that the labor-supply effects of a surprising instrument depend on the nature
of the error individuals are making. When what is happening is a failure of
will, rather than knowledge, labor supply seems most likely to increase. In
this scenario, some households know that they are getting a valuable
commitment device from the government and recognize the improved
budget allocation that device allows them. In contrast, when the error is a
mistake of attention or understanding, families could well reduce their labor
in response to the nudge because they do not see that the government has
actually made them better off. Future empirical work devoted to better
identifying how people are going wrong could therefore have significant
policy implications.

276. See Louis Kaplow, Myopia and the Effects of Social Security and CapitalTaxation on
Labor Supply 1-2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12452, 2006), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl2452 ("[E]ven an actuarially fair social security retirement
scheme ... might be imagined to have similar effects to a current tax on labor if individuals are
significantly myopic .... ").
277. Chetty et al. also suggest that employers could be convinced to offer default retirement
accounts with relatively small government incentives, perhaps just enough to cover the costs of
administration. See Chetty et al., supra note 14. That, too, is unclear. If employers currently
capture some or all of the benefit of the government subsidy, persuading them to agree politically
to the swap would likely require a promise to replace much of the current savings. Of course,
Chetty et al. might argue that since workers seem not to care about retirement savings, we might
think that employers cannot save much in the way of lower salaries, and therefore cannot capture
much of the subsidy. But if that is true, then workers would likely perceive default savings as a
tax, which means that the social welfare benefits of their proposal are smaller than they suggest.
278. GRUBER, supra note 32, at 650.
279. Another complication in the analysis is that shifting income from one period of life to
another also alters the marginal utility of a dollar for the worker. This factor can interact with
myopic preferences in complex ways. For a more complete discussion, see Kaplow, supra note
276, at 4-13.
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Pollution

Regulators and inventive commentators have proposed and sometimes
even road-tested a variety of nudge-like instruments for reducing carbon
and other forms of pollution.280 Some of these interventions have been
aimed at consumers, such as the various kinds of cues and defaults to
reduce household energy consumption championed by Richard Thaler and
Cass Sunstein and by Ian Ayres. 28' Although it's unclear that even in
combination all the proposed climate nudges could achieve the needed
levels of carbon reduction, 282 energy-conserving nudges look to be at least a
valuable component of any strategy. Consider first the household-level
nudges, such as "smart" energy meters that offer instant feedback to
households on their energy usage.2 83 It seems pretty straightforward that
these kinds of efforts are preferable to carrot transfers, such as paying
families to adopt conservation strategies, subsidizing weatherproofing, and
so on. Given the potentially vast number of inframarginal claimants for
such subsidies, the nudges almost certainly cost less, and either way will
have a lesser unwanted income effect on household energy consumption.
Less intuitively, the constellation of nudges could outshine a carbon
tax. At first glance, the nudges seem to sacrifice any possible revenue
recycling benefits from the carbon proceeds. But nearly all carbon-tax
proposals include efforts to mitigate the severe regressivity of taxes on
carbon, which function as a broad-based sales tax due to the energy
involved in manufacturing and transporting nearly any consumer good.284
In many proposals, most or all of the revenues from the carbon tax or its
equivalents (such as the 2009 cap-and-trade bill I mentioned earlier) would
be devoted to cash rebates for low-income households, making the carbon
tax close to transferless. 28 5 With some experiments, the nudges could be
matched to a shadow price, allowing them to approximate the informational

280. Vandenbergh et al., supra note 29, at 763-79.
281. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 257-61; AYRES, supra note 8, at 138-42.
282. For consideration of that question, see Thomas Dietz et al., Household Actions Can
Provide a Behavioral Wedge to Rapidly Reduce US Carbon Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
Sci. 18,452, 18,452 (2009) (estimating that behavioral changes can reduce U.S. emissions by
7.4% over the next decade).
283. Leslie Kaufman, Utilities Turn Their Customers Green, with Envy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/31/science/earth/31 compete.html?_r=O.
284. E.g., Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 499, 514 (2009); David A. Super, From the Greenhouse to the Poorhouse:
Carbon-Emissions Control and the Rules of LegislativeJoinder, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 119096 (2010).
285. For discussion of several alternatives, see Terry Dinan & Diane Lim Rogers,
Distributional Effects of Carbon Allowance Trading: How Government Decisions Determine
Winners and Losers, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 199, 205-06 (2002).
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benefits of the carbon tax. 286 So on these two traditional criteria, nudges
and taxes are similar.
Alternately, if the carbon tax does not include a rebate or rebates only
a portion of poorer households' average costs, nudges could present a tradeoff between revenues and fairer distribution. A nudge does still arguably
impose costs on some families-those who must exert effort to avoid or
ignore it. For instance, with greater feedback I might feel bad that I am
using too much energy. But these deadweight losses are more likely to be
equitably distributed across households rather than being borne most
heavily by the poorest. It certainly could be that the subjective mental costs
of avoiding energy-conserving nudges are greater for individuals with less
wealth, but it is not immediately obvious why that would be so. Early
empirical evidence on the distribution of the costs of mental effort are
unclear, with one or two papers
actually finding that richer people seem to
287
view effort as more costly.

So far, nudges and carbon taxes are roughly equivalent, but nudges are
probably better targeted in a couple of different respects. Even with
rebates, households retain a marginal incentive to conserve energy under a
carbon tax since, if my rebate is determined by everyone else's average
costs, I can come out ahead by being thriftier than they are. 288 Again, if
government cannot readily connect this marginal incentive with my
effective wealth, then a marginal dollar in incentives will overmotivate the
poor while undermotivating the very rich. Many conservation nudges in
contrast can be designed to affect primarily those who need greater
interventions. A thermostat set to automatically lower temperatures on
winter evenings is more likely to change the behavior of households who
are inattentive to energy use than those who are already paying attention.
These are also families who may well derive some additional internality
benefit from the nudge.289
A final factor to consider is crowd-out. Even if Glaeser is right that in
an economic sense nudges are every bit as "coercive" as taxes, not everyone
may see things the same way. 29 As we saw earlier, express dollardenominated incentives tend to replace other intrinsic motivation, but
286. Another important goal of carbon taxes is to not only reduce overall energy consumption
but also to shift the sources of energy to less carbon-intensive uses. Nudges can also be designed
to encourage switching. For instance, in addition to reporting total usage, smart meters could
report the mix of sources being drawn from the grid and allow the household to dynamically
adjust which source it prefers.
287. E.g., Jacob Goldin & Tatiana Homonoff, Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Cigarette Tax
Salience and Regressivity, 5 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL'Y 302, 331 (2013).
288. See KAPLOW, supra note 58, at 2-3 (explaining that rebates do not change first-best
analysis of Pigouvian taxes).
289. Carbon taxes could likewise help the family to better prioritize its spending, but at some
overall cost to them.
290. See sources cited supra note 18.
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nudges might not.
So carbon taxes could reduce altruistic energy
conservation, while nudges might leave it unchanged or even improve it.
Nudges might even help altruistic but low willpower individuals achieve
the greater conservation levels they desire.29'
D.

PositiveExternalities

Positive externalities offer a particularly fertile area for developing
new nudges. For the most part, carrots are the dominant U.S. instrument for
encouraging many important positive externalities, ranging from copyright
protections for artists to tax deductions for charitable contributions and
research and development.29 2 As I suggested earlier, in many cases nudges
can replace carrots in instances where sticks are problematic.
Charitable contributions are a possible example. Many of the tools
others have designed for pension savings could also be employed for
charitable giving. For example, employees could by default have a small
portion of their earnings in excess of a certain threshold distributed among a
short list of charities they had previously selected-say, 3% of income
above $40,000.293 Employees also could commit to donating a portion of
future earnings, as Thaler and Sunstein suggest. 294 More radically, and
taking a cue from Germany, the United States could collect donations for
charities through the tax system without subsidizing them. 295 Realized
gains on investment properties could be "taxed" an extra few percentage
points unless the taxpayer opts out, with the revenues flowing to their
designated charities.

291. Sunstein, supra note 214 (manuscript at 11-12).
292. See Galle, supra note 27, at 840 ("[C]arrots are commonplace-and more are, shall we
say, sprouting up all the time.").
293. The mean itemizing household currently donates about 2% of personal income to
charity. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., JCX-4-13, PRESENT LAW AND
BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE FEDERAL TAx TREATMENT OF CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS
45 (2013). If the employee never gets around to designating any beneficiary organizations, the
firm could select them or the money could be distributed to charities like the United Way that do
the choosing for their donors. A critic of the proposals might argue that the proposals somewhat
arbitrarily cap the amount of "subsidy" the government offers. In contrast, the deduction allows
donors to determine the amount of matching dollars the government will provide without limit as
long as annual contributions do not exceed 50% of adjusted gross income. That is accurate, but
note that it isn't inevitable that the deduction will always have this advantage. Several serious
legislative proposals over the past few years would cap the annual amount of subsidized
contributions for each donor. See ROGER COLINVAUX ET AL., EVALUATING THE CHARITABLE
DEDUCTION AND PROPOSED REFORMS 12 tbl.5 (2012), available at http://www.urban.org/Up
loadedPDF/412586-Evaluating-the-Charitable-Deduction-and-Proposed-Reforms.pdf.
294. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 231-32.
295. For an overview of the German system, see Stephanie Hoffer, Caesar as God's Banker:
Using Germany's Church Tax as an Example of Non-Geographically Bounded Taxing
Jurisdiction, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 595, 601-06 (2010). Of course, aiding
collection is itself a bit of a subsidy, but a much smaller one than the charitable contribution
deduction currently offers.
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Charitable nudges along these lines are likely superior on deadweight
loss terms to the current income tax deduction for charitable contributions,
while offering a somewhat less useful income effect than the deduction.
Obviously the nudge would not reduce government revenues to the extent
the deduction does.296 As with retirement savings though, it is possible that
donors could view the default as reducing their real returns to labor,
resulting in deadweight loss that mimics the cost of the lost revenue.
Donors who perceive the donation as a loss could also see themselves as
poorer, reducing their demand for charity. And of course the donor pays a
higher tax than she would with the deduction in place, which could further
diminish her demand.
The nudges have other advantages as well. They are almost certainly
better targeted than the deduction, much of the value of which is presently
claimed by donors who likely would give a substantial amount regardless of
the subsidy.297 Unlike the present design of the deduction, a nudge does not
reduce the progressivity of the tax system.298 Another criticism of the
deduction is that, because it offers larger rewards for higher income givers,
it tends to produce a charitable sector slanted towards the interests of the
rich.299 I have also argued that, unless charities can more firmly be
30 0
separated from the political sphere, the deduction distorts our politics.

Like a credit, the nudges I mentioned would somewhat mitigate these
tendencies, though of course wealthier donors will still have more to give.
Similar nudges could also be used to supplement or replace the estate
tax and its accompanying deduction for charitable bequests. 30 1 Though the
purposes behind the income tax deduction for charitable contributions have
been closely interrogated by commentators, the estate-tax deduction has
mostly escaped scrutiny. 30 2 Most of those who have examined it are
generally cheerful about its effects: in addition to subsidizing charities, it

296. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 293, at 44 tbl.2 (estimating $37.6
billion in 2012 federal tax savings for charitable contributors).
297. See MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40919, AN

OVERVIEW OF THE NONPROFIT AND CHARITABLE SECTOR 49 (2009) (stating that the charitable
contribution tax subsidy, based on one estimate, induces $0.50 of giving for each $1.00 of revenue

loss).
298. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 293, at 36 ("[T]he charitable
contribution deduction reduces a taxpayer's after-tax cost of giving by relatively more, the higher
his marginal tax rate."). Note, however, that the regressivity of the deduction could be offset by
increasing tax rates for the income brackets of individuals who tend to donate more. COLINVAUX
ET AL., supra note 293, at 10.
299. Mark P. Gergen, The Casefor a Charitable ContributionsDeduction, 74 VA. L. REV.
1393, 1405-06 (1988).
300. Brian Galle, Charitiesin Politics: A Reappraisal,54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1561, 160003(2013).

301. See 26 U.S.C. § 2055(a) (2006).
302. Miranda Perry Fleischer, CharitableContributions in an Ideal Estate Tax, 60 TAX L.
REV. 263, 264-67 (2007).
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303
serves to break up dynastic wealth, much like the estate tax generally.
That is true, but the two instruments get there in very different ways-most
obviously, one deposits money into the Treasury, while the other does
not. 30 4 Whether the remnants of dynasty should be allocated by the public
or the dynasts seems like it should be a question of some interest.
All that I want to say about the institutional design of dynasty-breaking
here is that nudges represent a third possibility. With nudges, the choice of
how to allocate wealth are framed and influenced by the public's agents
while the ultimate choices remain in the hands of donors. If the nudge
replaces the estate-tax deduction, we must decide whether the incremental
loss of private control and the deadweight losses to those who do not
surrender it are worth the revenue gains. Alternately, the nudge (if effective
enough) could replace the estate-tax system altogether. Then the question
would be whether the incremental gains in private control are worth the lost
dollars.

Conclusion
I have attempted here to offer the first extended consideration of the
relative efficiency of nudges and other surprising regulation alongside the
more traditional price-instrument and quantity-regulation alternatives. As
with any initial academic forays into untrodden ground, no doubt I have
made some missteps or overlooked some important areas for exploration.
For now though, it looks as though present widespread skepticism of
nudges and other surprising new policies may be misplaced. As a result,
New York's soda law and many other forms of asymmetric regulation may
merit closer consideration than others have so far been willing to offer. My
arguments also warrant at least some reconsideration of older regulatory
forms, such as prison or command-and-control regulation, whose inferiority
to price instruments has become a central tenet of law and economics.

303. E.g., James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 856
(2001); see also John G. Simon, Charity and Dynasty Under the Federal Tax System, 5 PROB.
LAW. 1, 33 (1978) ("[I]t is doubtful that the charitable deduction results in a less egalitarian
distributional pattern than what we would have in a world without deductions."). But cf
Fleischer, supra note 302, at 276-83 (agreeing with this point but cautioning that it does not
explain all the legal features of the existing deduction).
304. Cf Mark L. Ascher, CurtailingInherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 135-36 (1990)
(suggesting that an estate-tax deduction might be justified because it diversifies providers of
public goods); Ray D. Madoff, What Leona Helmsley Can Teach Us About the Charitable
Deduction, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 957, 965-66 (2010) (pointing out that a charitable estate-tax
deduction allows the very wealthy to effectively control use of government funds).

